Saturday, October 26, 2013

Foreword by the Translator, Prefaces by the Author, List of Contents, Ch. I,II, III and IV of Part I and Ch. 12 of Part II


From the German Original Entitled
“Die Philosophie der Freiheit als
Grundlage künstlerischen Schaffens “

(Dornach, 1988; ISBN-3-85704-152-8)


by


Herbert Witzenmann


Translation in Progress


by

Robert J. Kelder



Willehalm Institute
Amsterdam 2013

* * *

List of Contents

Foreword by the Translator
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition

Part I

The Philosophy of Freedom
As a Conceptional Work of Art

I.  INTRODUCTION

The Rank of Conscious Awareness/ Concerning Two Possible Objections Against This Publication/ On the Mode of Presentation/ A Further Objection

II. THE BASIC COMPOSITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE WORK

The Unity of Form and Content as Meditative Soul Guidance/ The Compositional Basis of the Two Main Parts/ The “Word” Character of "The Philosophy of Freedom”/ The Merit and Nature of Psychic Observation or Introspection/ The Compositional Arrangement of the Two Main Parts of the Work

III. THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN BEING

“The Philosophy of Freedom” as a Universal Study of Man/ The Ontological Levels of Creatures/ The Ontological Levels of Man/ The Anthropological Outcome

IV. TWO MAIN STREAMS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE WORK

Thinking Volition and Volitional Thinking, Their Different Unfoldment/ The Stages of Volitional Unfoldment as Compositional Forms of the First and Fourteenth Chapter/ The Stages of Volitional Unfoldment in the Fourteenth Chapter/ On the Community-building Function of Individual Judgements

V. THE GESTALT PRINCIPLE OF BOTH MAIN PARTS

The Composition of Both parts in Relation to the Stages of Volitional Unfoldment/ The Anthropological Composition  of the First Part/ The Anthropological Composition  of the Second Part/  Schematic Summary/ On the Mode of Presentation

VI. REVIEW AND OUTLOOK

The Basic Character of the Work, Its Demand on the Reader and the Riches It Has in Store for Him/ The Third Main Part

VII. THE IN-DEPTH STRUCTURE OF THE WORK

Consonant and Vowel Qualities in “The Philosophy of Freedom”, Man as Word, “The Philosophy of Freedom” as Book of the Human Word, Its Middle Part/ Surface Structure and In-depth Structure/  The Anthropological and the Cosmological Points of View/ Body, Soul and Spirit/ Cognition and Corporeality, Freedom and Spirituality, Speech and Soul Life


Part II

The Philosophy of Freedom
As a Path of Schooling for the Artist

1. Renewed Objection Against Conscious Awareness

2. Necessity of Discarding the Accustomed Mindset

3. Historical Contemplation and Contemporary Course of Action

4. Exchange-of-Being, Self-awareness/ Prayer/ The Christian Creative Mood

5. The New Artistic Era/ Protection/ The Exceptional Waking State of Mind

6. The Prejudices Concerning the Subjectivity and Objectivity of Thinking/  The Irrepresentability of Concepts/ The Review Exercise/  The Irrepresentability of Percepts/ Transparency Exercise/ Veiling and Unveiling/ Matter and Form/ The Path to the Upper and Lower Gods

7. The Representation as Helper and Teacher/ The Human Form as Cosmic Form/ The Cosmogenic Meditation as the Higher School of Form/ Beautiful Semblance as Higher Reality/ The Metamorphosis of the Particular and the Whole in One Another

8. The Individual Above Us, the Universal Within Us: the Highest Knowledge and the Greatest Experience/ Form as the Universal Human Being, Matter as the World Bewitched/ The Experience of Freedom

9. Schiller’s Aesthetic Anthropology and Social Aesthetics/ The Social Mission of Art/ The Dissolution of the Alloy King

10. The Experience of Form and Humanness as Experience of Destiny/ The Experience of Matter and Freedom as Experience of Re-embodiment of the Spirit

11. Light and Love as the Essence of Matter and Form

12. The Stages in the Path of Schooling of the Artist


First Appendix
The Composition of the Preface to the First Edition of “The Philosophy of Freedom”

Second Appendix
List of Contents of “The Philosophy of Freedom”


Epilogue to the 1st edition

Overview of the Work of Herbert Witzenmann


* * * 

A Plea for Support –
Surmounting Internal Difficulties

A Transpersonal Foreword by the Translator


The first attempt at translating the title, list of contents, the first and last chapter of Herbert Witzenmann’s "The Philosophy of Freedom as a Basis for Artistic Creation" goes back to 1981, when after an initial period of some three months’ work on the first edition, I handed my translation to the American poetess Daisy Aldan living and working at that time in Dornach, Switzerland,  where I had previously assisted her in her translation and publication of the first edition of Herbert Witzenmann’s work “The Virtues” (Folder Editions, New York). Her comment on my translation was that it was impossible to translate this exposition of Rudolf Steiner’s "The Philosophy of Freedom". Rather than take this as a final answer, I subsequently labored another three months on it and, after submitting it to her a second time, I was pleasantly surprised to hear from her that I had apparently done the impossible! 

But conditions in Dornach at that time were not sufficiently conducive enough to lead to a complete translation.  Herbert Witzenmann as a member of the executive-council of the General Anthroposophical Society and leader of the Section for Social Science and the Youth Section had been forced, due to an apparently insurmountable internal conflict to take a leave of absence from the regular meetings of the executive-council and no longer received any structural or financial support from the Society (his colleagues were barred from using the facilities of the Goetheanum and had to set up a new infra-structure to facilitate the continued work and teaching of Herbert Witzenmann in Dornach and nearby Arlesheim). This inner conflict concerned the in essence still unresolved and largely misunderstood "book question" dealing with the proper way to represent and publish the work of Rudolf Steiner on the basis of his spiritual testament (for more on this subject see Herbert Witzenmann’s social-aesthetic study “Charter of Humanity – The Principles of the General Anthroposophical Society as a Basis of Life and Path of Training”).

I mention these internal difficulties to give some explanation for the fact that it has lasted almost 33 years for this (updated) partial working translation to see the light of day and to venture the view that, had the conditions been more favorable for furthering the valuable work of Herbert Witzenmann - the only professional philosopher and experienced industrialist on the executive - the situation of the General Anthroposophical Society and indeed that of the world at large would have been in a better state than they are in now. For in spite of the above-described conflict situation, he did follow up in an admirable way the personal advice given to him by Rudolf Steiner to represent and defend his anthroposophy in a philosophical manner by writing a number of outstanding volumes, only very few of which (such as “Intuition and Observation”, “Idea and Reality of a Spiritual Schooling of Man”, “Pupilship  in the Sign of the Rose-Cross” (all sold-out) and more recently “The Just Price – World Economy as Social Organics” and "The Virtues - Seasons of the Soul") have been translated, but without the necessary support and full backing of the General Anthroposophical Society and its member societies in the English- speaking world, whose only justification for existence consists in furthering results of spiritual research, such as that of Herbert Witzenmann, done at the (Spiritual) Goetheanum.  

After being forced to leave Dornach in 1986 due to the lack of support and moving to Amsterdam, the situation within the Anthroposophical Society in the Netherlands that I came across was in this respect no better than the one I had just left. (Interesting in this respect is something that I heard just recently, namely that the well-known Dutch anthroposophist Bernard Lievegoed, at that time the president of the Dutch Society, was asked by the executive–council in Dornach to mediate in their internal conflict between Herbert Witzenmann and the rest of his colleagues concerning the book question. The choice for assigning Lievegoed for this task is questionable, because of the completely different traits of character between him and Witzenmann. The former is known, among other things, for his development of a path of schooling he called in his book The Eye of the Needle - Life and Working Encounter with Anthroposophy the way of Saturn, a path not based on thinking but on the will, on doing, which according my reading and some of his critics such as Walter Heijder in “Waarheid en werking” (Truth and Effect, not translated)  and Arnold Sandhaus “Antroposofie willen denken” (Wanting to Think Anthroposophy, not translated) has nothing to do with anthroposophy, which again others, such as the philosopher and medical doctor Ida-Marie Hoek deny, while others have written whole uncritical books on the subject. Herbert Witzenmann disqualifies this path of doing, the priority of action over knowledge and thinking, as can be read here in the first chapter, in paragraph 7: “When it is maintained that abilities arise in the doing (after having paid one’s dues or having slaved away under that imitation misnamed “practice”), then this only signifies that that presence of mind which lies in acting out of knowledge is gradually being supplanted by a mechanical and schematic busyness.” Without maintaining that this disqualification of the path of the will applies completely to the path of schooling as advocated by Bernard Lievegoed, it may at least become apparent that he was not exactly suited to mediate in this book conflict with its spiritual roots in the nature of anthroposophy as a being that needs our moral protection. It is therefore not so surprising that, as relayed to me by one of the insiders, that this "man of action" found Herbert Witzenmann to be “hysterical”, a description that is neither supported by this work nor by my own personal observation of the author, with whom I had the pleasure and honor to work for a number of years after having attended his Seminar For Youth, Art and Social Organics in Arlesheim, nearby Dornach for four years in the late seventies.)

Again, I only mention these internal, sad karmic difficulties as an explanation for the fact that since my move to Amsterdam in 1986 no support from the society in this country for translating Herbert Witzenmann’s work into Dutch, in spite of several requests over the last 22 years, was given either. This was of course no reason not to attempt to undertake this work and so, with very limited resources, a small number of his works were (partially) translated and published in Dutch. Next to the ones already mentioned, these are: "Geldordening als bewustzijnskwestie - Een nieuw financieel stelsel vereist een nieuw beschavingsprincipe" (Currency as Consciousness - A New Financial System Demands a New Principle of Civilization), "Een nieuwe economische orde – Rudolf Steiners social organica” (A New Economic Order – Rudolf Steiner’s Social Organics) and “De onvooringenomenheid van de antroposofie – een inleiding op Rudolf Steiners geesteswetenschap” (The Unbiasedness of Anthroposophy – An Introduction to Rudolf Steiner’s Spiritual Science).

My latest proposal to translate and publish the work of Herbert Witzenmann on social organics (his term for the extended idea of the threefold social organism) to the so-called coordinator of the Social Science Section of the School for Spiritual Science in The Netherlands (where it obviously belongs) was made during a meeting on October 5 last, but (privately and flatly) rejected for reasons that remain unclear or not given, but that may be due to the influence that Lievegoed still enjoys within the Society and the relatively bad name of Witzenmann as being too difficult to read. I had submitted this request along with two other initiatives for working groups in a paper “Werken aan de ziel van de Antroposofische Vereniging – De Vrije Hogeschool voor Geesteswetenschappen” (Working on the Soul of the Anthroposophical Society – The Free School for Spiritual Science”) also published on the closed (but now defunct) website initiated by the coordinator “Netwerk Antroposofie” (but open to members and those interested in anthroposophy). 

On this last meeting and on the previous one, I am writing a review in order to comment on and assist the current efforts underway here to further and enhance the development of the School for Spiritual Science by making the profound writing by Herbert Witzenmann on this subject available; see e.g. the three essays in the Dutch version of his “Charter of Humanity and "Vormgeven of beheren - Rudolf Steiners sociaalorganica - Een nieuwe beschavingsprincipe" ("To Create or to Adminstrate - Rudolf Steiner's Social Organics/ A New Principle of Civilization", which I have partially translated and made into a blog). All in the (idle?) hope that it will someday finally be appreciated and supported to some extent. I have interrupted writing this review in order to inform the English-speaking members and friends of the Anthroposophical Society of these developments and to ask for their possible encouragement and support, which is slowly coming forth. 

Someone who has already expressed his support and participation in a possible conference on the work of Herbert Witzenmann in English and/or Dutch is the well-known Australian professor of philosophy Wayne Hudson, who also taught at the University of Utrecht for years and who has 19 books to his name, whom I hereby want to extend my thanks. On this further support will depend on whether I will work on completing this work or devote my energies and time to other current projects undertaken by the Willehalm Institute.

Update: Encouraged by the support given by Tom Last on his site Philosophy of Freeom, I have continued this (working) translation and have added so far the first four paragraphs of the second chapter of Part 1. Now up to ch. III.

Amsterdam, October 26, 2013; last updated November 13, 2017                Robert J. Kelder

* * *

Preface to the Second Edition

The new edition contains, next to numerous corrections, a series of elaborations and supplements that bring the train of thought more graphically to the fore.
           
The main, unchanged purpose of the book is threefold: The high degree of conceptual accuracy and inventiveness in Rudolf Steiner‘s mode of presentation as employed in his "Philosophy of Freedom" is not only to be delineated in terms of form and content, but also the nature of conceptional art shall be gleaned from the chosen example more vitally than can be done by general deliberations. The artistic path of schooling is furthermore to be developed as a meditative and practical autodidactive aid by following how this path of grasping the form-content-unity is transformed into a process of self-discovery.  And finally, the correspondence between free and artistic conscious awareness and its significance for social life as well as for the renewal and strengthening of civilizational energies in general shall be put forward.
           
The demonstrated correspondence between the conscious awareness of freedom and that of art as well its characteristic significance for Rudolf Steiner’s work as a whole is the main content of this work. With his reference to a hitherto unknown mode of consciousness, the author believes to make a contribution to the pressing demands of our times and thereby to justify the publication of his work. For upon observing the unsettling symptoms of our public state of affairs, it seems to him that above all two things need to be seriously considered. On the one hand (and herewith there is a fairly general agreement), our problems and our steadily growing self-embroilment therein through our mitigating attempts to solve them demand new insights and in general a new scientific mindset. On the other hand (and here there is hardly any consensus), the starting-point for a new conflict-resolution awareness calls for a new appraisal or conceptional evaluation of consciousness as such. The author is convinced that only herewith a promising new begin, a truly orientating knowledge and technique can be found.  For the crisis of our times consists of the transition from an application-bound conscious awareness to one that through self-apprehension secures its own autonomy and intrinsic value. Herein the difficulties of our situation, but also its inherent possibilities, fatalities are determined yet also its hopes.

This book takes a stance in this crisis situation in as much as it delineates a new type of consciousness (in its mode of application as well as in the path of schooling leading to its possession). In this preface, only some wide and far-reaching indications about the turning point in which, as many among us will agree, we find ourselves can be made. The evolution of humankind is hitherto, independent of its extra-ordinary epochal differences, one of the application of the human soul forces towards their usefulness. The driving force active hereby in the depth of the development of consciousness furthered its progress into the largely unconscious and unintentional realm on the basis of an inner orientation acquired from the apprehension of the succeeding turn of events. Nevertheless, the application of the human soul forces led with an unnoticed progressive intensity in clarity to the growing characteristic and diffusion of their self-apprehension. To recognize that the task of our civilization consists in a fully conscious understanding of the intrinsic value and meaning of the psychic-spiritual existence of the human being, and that its goal lies in the solution and realization thereof, that is the opportunity and the danger we must face up to. By designating our situation as post-industrial, only one of the manifold modes of appearance of the process of disengagement moving from the application to the self-apprehension of our psychic-spiritual forces is apprehended.
           
Hereto the following clarification may be added. In contradiction to the afore-mentioned task, our civilization is turning with aggressive intolerance and self-deluded arrogance the operationalistic obsession and superstition into its main distinguishing feature and interest. Every procedure and conduct not certified by the utilitarian stamp of approval guaranteeing success in their application for the sole sake of survival is considered to be fraudulent or mad. If besides that, the annual fairs and auction of useless glittering virtuosities are still tolerated, then only so because the eye-popping, fanatical and snobbish discharge of the dissatisfied crowd is of service to the refreshment of the urges for gratification exclusively considered to be value bearers. The significance of this materialistic world religion lies in the fact that just through the disintegration of all superior attitudinal and sentimental contents proceding from it, it strengthens the faculty of autonomous self-apprehension, thus cooperating in the formation of a soul attitude that gets into an ever growing tension with its own materialistic depersonalizing dogma.

An initial understanding for the significance of our entrance into a post-operationalistic era can be secured by convincing oneself in the sense of this publication through psychic observation (introspection) of the consciousness-form of reality. The materialistic mode of appearance of reality as something made conscious only through our sense organs is after all a delusion. All true progress can therefore only be described in terms of a change in mental attitude, in development of consciousness. This of course has, be it for other reasons than today, always been the case. Emerging from the depths of consciousness and embracing members of language communities, powerful heralds brought these impulses of expression, which through their swimming action only brought the crest height of their enormous waves to foam up, to ever new shorelines that they covered with their epoch-making deeds. The cultural and psychic-spiritual life was never an epiphenomenon of an economic line of existential self-defense. Not Darwinist adaption to the supremacy of impressions, but the superiority of – be it hitherto not master of itself – expression is from time immemorial the driving force in the history of humankind.

Through the materialistic mortification of the instinctive geniality and its naive confidence in productivity, present-day humanity has manouevered itself into a postion of duress, but thereby also in the possibility of searching for the origin and cultivation of new creative sources in its cleared consciousness. To understand and strengthen the ground in which expression can take root (in the double sense of the ground for knowledge and that of action) is its main task and the condition for its survival. There can after all be no other instance of decisive importance, for the human being is the extent of his expressed existence (namely the forwards pressing permeation of the formless perceptible with the formative concepts) and the human being itself is the expression out of this self-creating expression. Therefore the questions concerning the world and humanity are in similar ways questions of expression, the all-encompassing question of consciousness. The ebb and flood of consciousness-raising broke until now into the therefore receptive human waves of consciousness, - but as of today the human being can and must itself determine its new course. Hence it is necessary to realize above and beyond all else the priority of a new evaluation of conscious awareness. A new phase of consciousness must be reached - and this time not driven by the overwhelming force of events, but with its own inherent powers. This is the case, because the meaning of our existence lies not in exhausting its strenght for the maintenance of its bodily basis, but to incorporate them into the one and only valid context of developing a new epoch of expression. Not in slavish submission to the conditions of human existence, but through free apprehension and confirmation creatively scaling them and grasping the possibilities being offered, that is how the human being finds, sets itself its destination. 

That which is most shaped by consciousness, thus by expression, that which is the least forced into the duress of impressions is the most (even though in this way not known and recognized) contemporary of all things. Such an attitude of consciousness and its practical application, neither determined by its origin nor its goal, but freely floating  in itself, that is what art is.  It transforms consciousness in (insofar present) the material expression and attains from and in that expression new consciousness as well as therein new human selfhood.  In the same way artistically created is the free state of consciousness and the conduct originating from it, which have no other significance than that which they themselves attribute to it – whereby they are the most creative and in the true sense of the word furthering growth, namely progressive.

This is where one becomes aware of the correspondence between the free and the artistic modes of consciousness and their path of performance. At the same time, however, also of the emergencies, demands and hopes of the cultural creative energies, whose vitalization we require by connecting with their sources yet at the same time by elevating them to new heights by a spiral screw-like movement. The new evaluation of conscious awareness  corresponds with and arises from the insight that what in our time is considered least useful is needed the most, what in its intrinsic value is considered the least useful is the most inspiring and invigorating, thus coming nearest to and most of all serving that which is generally named “practical”.

That which is brought forward here in a more programmatic than a substantiating manner, yet based on a careful treatment of the subject matter, is what this book wants to develop in detail through its reference to a great example as well as through its assistance in the attempt to create a truly contemporary mind-set and its practical applications.

Garmish-Partenkirche, September 1987                                            Herbert Witzenmann



* * *

Preface to the First Edition

This publication is the result of having lived over a period of many years with Rudolf Steiner’s “The Philosophy of Freedom”. It is part of a much more embracing work planned already some time ago and from which the author still hopes to present several further instalments. The present volume is primarily devoted to the artistic undercurrent of the work, but gives, nevertheless, or just for that reason, an introduction to its entire thought content and thereby as well to Rudolf Steiner’s spiritual science in general. For as he himself formulated: “The Philosophy of Freedom” answers those questions fundamental to all knowledge.

The larger work mentioned, to which this publication belongs, is conceived as a kind of commentary on “The Philosophy of Freedom”. To present such a commentary in terms of pedantic explanations or by quoting parallel passages from other parts of the author’s work is not the aim here. Such an undertaking would only amount to a collection of material. Such a compilation would require a similar effort of disclosing its content as was attempted here. These deliberations want to be productive within the work of Rudolf Steiner by participating in the completion of the interior of its mighty architecture, of which only first drafts are available. Therefore, it is not the purpose of this “commentary” to convey knowledge, but to stimulate exercises in the observation of thinking.  That is what present-day humanity requires if it is to find other basic modes of cognition and conduct from the ones dominating it today. That something of a different nature must take their place is beginning to be understood. Yet for want of an overall orientation, one relapses time and again into the position of improving particular institutions and measures without having changed the way of thinking and the situation as a whole. It is impossible to discover new points of view or creative and inventive solutions for specific instances without gaining an entirely new access to the realm of what is real and human.

For that purpose neither observing the world without first gaining new perspectives nor assembling items of knowledge will suffice. What is needed, rather, is an exertion of the kind that changes one’s own being. The path and goal of such a metamorphosis can only be found by way of psychich observation (introspection), which develops an untapped wealth in the depths of one’s soul. In relation to the overal task, the author would like to ask only a small amount of this effort from his reader, whom he does not wish to see as the recipient of a ready-made theory, but much rather as a colleague forging a newly emerging type of consciousness. He believes to convey, however, to to those willing to undertake such an effort, an artistic experience almost second to none.

Pforzheim, December 1979                                                              Herbert Witzenmann



* * *  

Part I

The Philosophy of Freedom
As a Conceptional Work of Art

I  INTRODUCTION

The Rank of Conscious Awareness/ Concerning Two Possible Objections Against this Publication/ On the Mode of Presentation/ A Further Objection

Artistic creation and scientific cognition seem to repel each other. After all, the latter arises from a mode of consciousness attributed to the comprehension of reality, whereas the former seeks to foreshadow the compelling shape of things to come.  Granted, there are significant examples of artists drawing insight and gaining inspiration for their creative work from the store of scientific knowledge of their day; e.g. Hebbel gained from Hegel, and Wagner received decisive material for sight and song from Schopenhauer, naturalism is inconceivable without the more recent findings of natural science and the surrealists were influenced by Stirner and Nietzsche, dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis. Yet the sources of their productivity they all drew from shafts, which according to them, lay beyond contemplation and description. Indeed, the view that artistic creation and conscious awareness do not tolerate each other is still to this day widely prevalent.  One fails to recognize, however, that thereby more is asserted that can be represented. Two main reasons make this clear. First, no account is given for the fact that there are different forms and degrees of consciousness, modes of appearance and emanation. And secondly, it is forgotten that the criterion of artistry must be found within its own realm and that only from there the question as to the part played by the state of consciousness in the production of a work of art can be asked. Any prejudgement on the role of conscious awareness, before having put it to the test by examining an artwork, is therefore out of place.

The leading conviction of this book concerns cognition as a creative human faculty that is not only derived from an external reality.  The theory that productive cognition plays a formative role in the processes of reality was basically developed by Rudolf Steiner in his “Philosophy of Freedom” and constitutes the starting-point for a universal science of expression. Although he himself has drawn its outline in bold new strokes, this science is in its diversity and diffusion far from being completed.

This publication intends to present a contribution toward this elaboration. The new science of expression marks also the decision on the hitherto unresolved controversy about art and conscious awareness. The idea of a universal science of expression is the effect and at the same time the retrograde foundation of a science of man that does not consider the human being to be merely a receptive and afflicted creature.  Modern natural science, however,   does not even entitle him to the faculty of perception, but only that of affliction through the imperceptible. Productive cognizant, fully conscious man, however, is not only a recipient, but a designer capable of hearkening and speech, perceiving and professing and in the act of self-expression knowing himself and shaping the world surrounding him as an extension of this self-research. As an expressionist not only the producer of ideological epiphenomena, he steers the origins of reality in directions, which without his intervention would not be revealed in the life of soul.

2

This basic idea of Rudolf Steiner’s spiritual science spreads the greatest possible influence on all possible areas of human interest. Man as a being capable of perception and understanding, in command of language by speaking, forming his own word and shaping the world in the way it was indeed prepared for him in the course of evolution, yet remaining mute until he loosened the tongue from his sense, this being is the beneficiary of a heritage accumulated over a long period of time.  Attaining this in order to possess it, however, is something that he has become capable of only in modern times and the capacity for this attainment  is the conscious awareness revealing and having revealed itself from its own source. Faced with this task, which as long as it remained dormant or even unknown, posed the heaviest of burdens, man today  stands in the course of an ancient tradition.  Its earliest spark of self-understanding (not its origin) lit up in the Aristotelian ( nus poiätikos): cognition apprehending and illuminating itself through its own power (as the highest conscious awareness) is doing and knowing, the archetypal art from which all other arts are derived. As such, it is also the calling of man to fulfill his evolutionary task to become a responsible producer of expression, in short to become an artist.  This means not only a radical refoundation of aesthetics, but much more so entails the demand for an aestheticization of all sciences and in general all things human. All sciences must be understood as fields of a universal study of man and therewith a knowledge of man having become speech, of the Word of Man creating itself in the co-creation of the Word.

Here the bridge must be built to span the gap between science, art and social life, here the outlook for recovering their lost unity brightens up: a universal linguistics has the task and the capability of pointing the way for science to art, for art the way to science and by means of a social-aesthetic cognition and craft the way for social life to become a social work of art embracing all other arts. No doubt, whoever knows conscious awareness only as ephemeral shadow play will treasure the blood rush of the unconscious as a creative stimulus.  In contradiction, this publication as a living testimony to the work to which it is dedicated will set forth that the true nature of cognition is not the conceptually pale but rather creative spirit warmly entering world phenomena, that there exists a conscious awareness, which in comparison to such incitements surfacing from the darkness of the bodily organization is in the brilliance of its formative force second to none.

3

Such words may well sound unworldly enthusiastic or even outrageous in the face of the desolation brought on by the desire and enjoyment of welfare on the one hand, and the stupefaction of those starving under the most pitiful conditions of poverty on the other. This all the more so since the profiteers and peddlers of so-called “quality of life” are only aware of saturation.  To the concerned observer of these signs of our times such self-delusions lifted by their own melodious sounds of the present into clouds of bliss, appear understandably deaf and dumb to humanity’s utter misery. For who could deny that without clearly recognizing it, humanity staggers from desire to delight and is even deemed happy when, instead of sinking into the bliss of habit, it languishes in delight before desire, - or that it, while perishing under the most abject deprivation (without deciding which is the greater misery), it craves to be rescued only to lose therein its last foothold. People today forget that they do not live by bread alone (the satisfaction of their needs), even though it remains certain that they cannot do without. The addiction to this forgetfulness demonstrates that upon becoming aware of their condition its representatives throw themselves in the narcosis of enterprise. Through this step they believe to procure themselves a good conscience, since that carries after all the honorable stamp of service to society. Yet only a small dose of introspection is required to notice that this elf-sedation is nothing more than the flight from one’s inner voice, because it avoids the basic question. After all, no matter how puffing and panting this industriousness is, when it does not know the answer to the soul’s hunger, it only contributes to the vicious circle of desires, to the demand for the do-it-yourself, forget-your-self saturation, to that worldwide covetous piety, which makes people - however much it may reflect the impression of happiness – though increasing claims and demands, only more and more unhappy. Yet their true desire, even though in a false state of mind they may deny it, is not satisfaction, but creative discontent, the ultimate, the only true happiness of giving oneself away in doing, for the increase of which one’s efforts are never enough. Already the slightest accomplishment turns thereby into that feast whose most able judges are the children.  For we are born for its celebration and no one, who is not totally confused and lost his bearings, can deny that he has at least occasionally partaken in it – and in doing so became his true self. This festival of giving is true love that loves both its produce as well as its process and finds its satisfaction in the accord between the creative forces of expression and their feed-back. The supreme goal is not “service to society”, but the unconditional giving of oneself for no other sake than the giving itself. But this is just the power and mission of art and that is why it is the healer of all crime. This is what the following deliberations in their way want to address.

These introductory remarks are not meant to solve the problem which lies before them and which present itself in the negative silhouette of the two cases of prejudice brought forward: the supposed incompatibility between artistic creativity and cognitional awareness as well as the supposed priority of the useful over the deed done for its own sake, the preference thus for the satisfaction of bodily-bound needs over the free enfoldment of human expressiveness.  Those artists dabbling in dullness may, if need be, attach some importance to the cognitional mode of consciousness, if it serves them to stimulate their unconscious driving-force, thus if it adds something of use to their “artistic” creativity, which they consider to be the superior of the two.  These busy-bodies leading a life of luxury are now and then prepared  - provided of course that it not destroy their own concept – to acknowledge the socially engaged, critical art and when, although originally non-utilitarian, it is an accountable entry in the debts and credits of a group or class. Both attitudes, utilitarian in different ways, are thoroughly capable of joining forces against the case for creative cognition.

4

By means of the previous remarks the author wanted only to reach an understanding with his reader concerning the obligation he has taken up by devoting his work to the subject of artistic creation and at the same time locating his point of departure in the cognitional faculties of man: he thereby commits himself in two ways, since admittedly his purpose is to refute the two above-mentioned objections. Yet he has no intention to do so by conceptional refutation only. Rather, by way of an example he consider unique, he endeavors to show that conscious cognition and artistic creation originate from the same root, ascend to begin with in divergent directions and finally intertwine again at the crown.  What the one receives from the other, how they are mutually indebted – this must become understood in view of the necessity of establishing a new culture on the ruins of the old.

That “The Philosophy of Freedom” does not convey this insight as dead knowledge but as a living power, not to confirm this but to activate it, this is what this publication has in mind. Crucial thereby is that the Gestalt character of the human and the real that form the content of “The Philosophy of Freedom” constitutes at the same time also the compositional principle of its text. A just understanding of this correspondence is not gained when one expects it to be forced upon the text as a schematic division in the usual sense of summarizing similar elements and combining them piecemeal in mere logical sequence.  Instead, the constructional principle is the presentation of an incisive idea, which identical with its literary appearance, unified but not uniform, becomes active  in various stages of metamorphosis according to the content of textual segments. It establishes the framework of the material presented and is in turn rendered understandable by the content of the material. As with every real work of art, matter and form (in this case: thought content and the idea of its development) also condition each other. Neither one occupies a superior position, neither advances in front of the other in the delineating consciousness, rather they condition each other in such a way that they mutually create each other and simultaneously develop out of each other. This general characteristic will only become fully comprehensible through the detailed examination of the composition of “The Philosophy of Freedom. Then the special feature of Rudolf Steiner’s literary conceptional style will come to the fore in the sense that it always, although in alternating reciprocal elucidation, brings forth the same thing twice, in one case as matter, in the other as form.

5

Once it is recognized that “The Philosophy of Freedom” is in fact and fashion a conceptional art work in great style, one is then also prepared for the second part of this publication. This aims to creating an understanding of the significance that the path of knowledge in “The Philosophy” has for the artist, who desires a modern schooling of his creative potential. Thereby it will become evident what mode of consciousness hitherto unrevealed in this manner can revitalize the human creative powers, whose exhaustion we are becoming aware of with increasing consternation and fear. In this regard, it is the main purpose of the second part to develop the conceptual stages for the development of a free aesthetic awareness in a series of reviving steps. ”The Philosophy of Freedom”, far removed from conveying reproducible knowledge, molds these sequential stages in unity of form and content into an experiential event. Not only an account concerning the real and the human, but a textbook for conscious participation, not only representation, but an inner summoning of a procedure such that it leads those following it into a guided current of events that continues as the activity of the self-taught man.

6

This publication proceeds as much on the basis of the method applied by Rudolf Steiner as on his own comments on the essential nature of his work as a piece of conceptional art. 

His newly developed line of approach is psychic observation or introspection according to the method of natural science. This method will be applied here to "The Philosophy of Freedom" and thereby also to the inner movements made in following its train of thought.

In the first chapter of the original edition “The Aim of All Knowledge”, which served as a kind of preface and which was placed in the appendix of the second edition, Rudolf Steiner wrote the following about his work, “The composer works on the basis of a theory of composition. This is a sum of knowledge that is a prerequisite for composing. Here the laws of composition are used to serve life, true reality. In exactly the same sense, philosophy is an art. All true composers were conceptional artists. Human ideas became the material for their work and the scientific method their artistic technique. Abstract thinking thereby gains concrete, individual life. Ideas become living powers. We then have not merely knowledge about things, but have turned knowledge into a real, self-governing organism; our actuated consciousness has risen above the level of mere passive reception of truth.
How philosophy as an art relates to human freedom, what the latter is and whether we partake or can partake of it, that is the main question of my book.”

The method of psychic observation will be elucidated in its application during the course of this presentation. What can be said here about it so far is that it assumes one of the main tasks in the contemporary redevelopment of the productive sources of consciousness and that the rise of a new cultural era depends on their fertility. For only the method of self-exploration can help bring the stagnating and apparently exhausted human resources to a breakthrough again and raise the riches hidden in the subconscious to the surface. As the key to the driving-forces of a new mode of consciousness, psychic observation becomes a matter of epochal significance.

With what measure of seriousness and mastery Rudolf Steiner undertook this momentous mission and carried it through  as evidenced in his sense of responsibility and enthusiasm for language, that is what the following presentation endeavors to the bring near to the understanding  experience of the reader. Its aim can therefore not consist in the zealous juxtaposition of things Rudolf Steiner said. The nature of a work of art lies in the unfolding of its inherent reality, which can only be grasped by actively following its thread; hence the goal of this presentation can only be to convey an insight into the technique of conceptional art. It aims to provide a stimulus for its co-execution, towards learning the language it speaks by carefully tuning in to it. Then it will dawn on the willing reader that conceptional art in the light of his meditative practice appears as the conscious mode of freedom. Some indications concerning the social significance of this type of consciousness were already made and shall continue to be made in the course of this publication.

The herewith indicated plan of presentation, the sense and value of which can of course only be ascertained through its implementation, aspires to show that "The Philosophy of Freedom” is a training and meditation manual primarily through its artistic structure and rank. It wants to make evident that the value of that work is misjudged and its purpose misunderstood when its contents are construed to be the conceptual derivation of an abstractly conceived result. Rudolf Steiner himself strongly emphasizes that in his preface to the second edition, “The view discussed here is of such a nature that, once attained, it can become an integral part of the soul. A theoretical answer, which once acquired is merely carried about as a memorized conviction, is not given. To the way of thinking on which this book is based such an answer would only be a plausible one. A finished, ready-made reply of that sort will not be provided, but an experiential field of the soul will be pointed to, where in each instance or moment that the human being needs it, the question is vitally answered anew through the inner activity of the soul itself…. A knowledge that proves its justification and validity through its own existence and the relationship of this existence proper to the whole realm of human soul life appears thereby to be formulated."

That "The Philosophy of Freedom" is a textbook by virtue of both its content in artistic values and its form as a conceptional work of art is none the less made clear in that previously quoted passage, which in later editions was placed in the appendices. The science of freedom introduces, like no other work of Rudolf Steiner, its reader to the practice of meditation. It accompanies him to the heights and depths of meditative experience. The path of schooling is demonstrated in the second part of this publication.

7

Numerous objections besides the ones already mentioned could be raised against this outline. Only one of these, which takes its starting-point in the strong emphasis given here to the meditative aspect of "The Philosophy of Freedom", shall still be considered here. This objection is especially typical of our time. Many people, it is true, are attracted to training courses of the sort that, while stemming mostly form the East, promise salvation from the distress of conscious awareness. Yet the path indicated here, which draws from the depth of consciousness and leads to its heights, will be rejected by them as misleading; it offers, after all, not a retreat, but rather demands effort and risk. Others meanwhile, who have in mind only their own material welfare and that of others only for their own sake, will reject our aspirations no less vehemently. For (so it is often said) our situation (which to others is so attractive) demands in the face of its pressing needs and threats coming from all directions, quick and decisive action. It leaves us no time for withdrawn aspirations for self-perfection. In action, only in action can the abilities demanded by the tasks awaiting us (beyond the initial and perennial unavoidable mistakes) be acquired: as the saying goes, only in the water do we learn how to swim.

This objection lacks the concepts of activity and community. We are active only in the sphere where we ourselves are acting. Productive as autonomous beings – this we are only in and by virtue of thinking. This is not the case within the dull and dim desires of the will; there, thoughts previously one’s own continue to have their effect as formless creatures of habit or are seized by the designs of others. When it is maintained that abilities arise in the doing  (after having paid one’s dues or having slaved away under that imitation misnamed “practice”), then this only signifies that that presence of mind which lies in acting out of knowledge is gradually being supplanted by a mechanical and schematic busyness. Acting out of knowledge, however, however, does not acquire spirit and value through reproduction but through production. And the latter requires the tapping and channeling of creative sources which can only be found within the aesthetic realm of free consciousness. There is no meaningful action without ability, no ability without training. Whoever believes, therefore, to lack the time necessary for creativity training and with a sneering grin doubts that this can be spread as the principle of civilization, has missed once and for all the fruitful moment of destiny, whose auspiciousness cannot be gauged by the dull and dimwitted, but only by the clear-cut vision of the trained eye.

But also the concept of community is failing by those who deem it necessary to be stingy with their time. For it is a prejudice to believe that by taking care of one’s own lot, one shies away from helping the poor and needy. Certainly, those dying of thirst need water to be handed them without a moment’s hesitation. The well-being of a community at large, however, is not improved thereby. For this depends, on the one hand, on the communicative processes of the development of consciousness and, on the other hand, on the so-to-speak underground communication of humanity (the rough comparison may be allowed). Humanity constitutes a unity. This may be stated as a result of observation, since the inner unity of concepts (their subjective and objective generality) is evident from the fact that there are no other interconnections than those shown to psychic observation or introspection as self-definition of thinking. This spiritual tapestry of being is the universal mind, the all-consciousness, out of which the individual human beings draw their individual consciousness according to the extent of their inner power. Even without external contact they thereby convey the modifications arising from the process of the development of human self-consciousness to the universal consciousness. What the individual gain or spoils thereby in his spiritual being can therefore not remain without significance for the human community (its spiritual unity) as a whole. The faint-at-heart, who deny the social value of this work at one’s own nature, damage the human community and fail to see the responsibility they owe to it.

Yet enough of the examination of modes of representation that deny the true nature of man. After all, nothing more is needed than the evidence that there exists a reality-based consciousness which is different from such short-sightedness. This will be done in this publication. Left up to the reader is to decide which one of these paths of knowledge and experience he gives preference to.




II. THE BASIC COMPOSITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE WORK

The unity of form and content as meditative soul guidance/ The compositional basis of the two parts/ The “word” character of the “Philosophy of Freedom”/ The merit and nature of psychic observation or introspection/ The compositional arrangement of the two main parts of the work

First a summary will be given of the afore-going indications that are now to be substantiated in detail. The composition of "The Philosophy of Freedom” does not follow the rules normally applied to literary constructions. The value of such rules is not to be denied and for this work they are of secondary importance as well. Compositionally of essence for the subject of this study, however, is the coincidence of its form and its content in a third factor, which does not appear through the means of expression but only in the experience of the reader. This factor, which is not representable by letters but only to be evoked, receives its living strength from the correspondence between de structure of what is presented and its content. The content of this book is on the one hand the nature of reality, and on the other hand the nature of the human being, whose calling it is to become free. It describes the emergence of freedom and reality from the same root.


From this embracing compositional principle proceed also the individual parts of the presentation. Though this formal attribute is not explicitly indicated as such in the expositions of the content, it ensues from the content itself, the arrangement of which it determines. The formal characteristic of the chapters emerges all the more clearer from their conceptional interrelationship. This is therefore not just a logical one; the mere logical train of thought could also take another course. Instead, logical and aesthetic principle intersect each other in the composition of the work, since both are subservient to the superior principle of its reality- and spirit-based organization. By virtue of the fact that the author, through this art of presentation, offers the reader the possibility to participate in the gradual unfoldment of the text as a happening that does not only belong to the subjective representations of the author, but that represents reality itself through its structural-compositional correspondence  with it, all factors of the soul life of the one thus approached (next to mentally representing also his feeling and willing) are addressed and set in motion. The reader is being confronted in the totality of his humanity with the natural as well as his own reality and invited to enter into their realm. The reading thereby becomes an exercise in meditation, and this all the more so as the inexpressibility of the expression in its inner reenactment becomes conscious. The thus experientially achieved reunion with reality that in the mentally representing faculty of the present-day human being has faded into a schema, is the eye-opener for the higher spiritual world above which the world of the senses spreads its veil. In which way the “Philosophy of Freedom” as aesthetic-meditative soul guidance, as a conceptional work of art is the most reliable and trustworthy guide to the threshold where essence and appearance part, that is what now shall be gradually developed.


2

This contemplation first turns to the two main parts of "The Philosophy of Freedom”. The compositional significance of the other parts shall be viewed later.

Information about the viewpoints under which the main content of the work in both main parts “The Science of Freedom” and “The Reality of Freedom” are arranged is given above all by the Preface to the New Edition (1918) and the First Addition to its third part, “The Consequences of Monism”, in the new edition, i.e. remarks placed at the beginning and at the end of the whole text.

The preface to the new edition points to the two “basic questions of the life of the human soul”, towards which everything is directed what is to be addressed by this book. One of these basic questions concerns the search for a fixed point within the human being; the other concerns that most essential of the manifestations coming forth from such a point, if the latter exists. “One is: Is it possible to find a view of the essential nature of man such as will give us a foundation for everything else that comes to meet us — whether through life experience or through science — which we feel is otherwise not self-supporting and therefore liable to be driven by doubt and criticism into the realm of uncertainty? The other question is this: Is man entitled to claim for himself freedom of will, or is freedom a mere illusion begotten of his inability to recognize the threads of necessity on which his will, like any natural event, depends? […]This book is intended to show that the experiences which the second problem causes man's soul to undergo depend upon the position he is able to take up towards the first problem. An attempt is made to prove that there is a view of the nature of man's being which can support the rest of knowledge; and further, that this view completely justifies the idea of free will, provided only that we have first discovered that region of the soul in which free will can unfold itself.”

In the first addition to the third part of the book “The Consequences of Monism” the following words are found: “The second part of this book (“The Reality of Freedom”) finds its natural support in the first part. This presents intuitive thinking as man's inwardly experienced spiritual activity. To understand this nature of thinking by experiencing it amounts to a knowledge of the freedom of intuitive thinking. And once we know that this thinking is free, we can also see to what region of the will freedom may be ascribed. We shall regard man as a free agent if, on the basis of inner experience, we may attribute a self-sustaining essence to the life of intuitive thinking. Whoever cannot do this will never be able to discover a path to the acceptance of freedom that cannot be challenged in any way. This experience, to which we have attached such importance, discovers intuitive thinking within consciousness, although the reality of this thinking is not confined to consciousness. And with this it discovers freedom as the distinguishing feature of all actions proceeding from the intuitions of consciousness.”

These two indications characterize the relation between both main parts of the work. The first main part describes how the human being emerges from reality and what sort of relation he can assume with regard to it. The second main part describes how the human being can produce out of himself a self-induced reality and what significance this has for the evolution of the world.

There is thus an inverse relationship between both parts; the first part describing the emergence of the human being from existing reality, the second part a new reality arising out of the human being.

From a knowledge of the text and also in view of the afore-mentioned, it may be objected that the theme of the emergence of reality out of the human being, namely its origin in the human act of knowledge, is already to be found in the first part. This objection is only justified, however, in so far as it concerns the ideational-functional intertwining of both parts; it concerns furthermore two different sorts of reality. The cognitional reenactment of the real through the union of percept and concept becomes conscious of reality with the knowledge of each thing or being. In this way, however, the human being also becomes conscious of his own emergence from reality. For cognition gives insight into the natural foundations of human existence, the origin of his physical organism out of matter and processes derived from the kingdoms of nature. Knowledge in its acts, however, is at the same time self-realization. For in the co-formation of reality the human being forms himself as a spiritual being, thus experiencing also the spiritual part of his being in its emergence from the real. This genesis is at the same time, however, also the origin of his faculty for ideational intuitions, from which the new reality sphere of his freedom arises. In that realm the human being moreover also experiences the continuing influence of the original nature-like reality-forming powers. For it is from them that he creates his libertarian being, yet in such a way that he reshapes them in his own being and thereby imparting them a new form-of-being. Thus the formation of reality and freedom interpenetrate each other in both main parts of the work, yet in a different manner.  By the characterization of these parts, it is therefore good to turn one’s gaze, on the one hand, upon  the emergence of the human being from reality, and on the other hand upon the emergence of reality from the human being.

Even though both parts of the “Philosophy of Freedom” unfold their presentation task in a manner that every time, although from different points of view, blends the whole realm of human existence, it is nevertheless in both cases another mode of expression of the total human being that determines the basic character of its remarks. The conceptional development about the “Science of Freedom” in the first part is directed towards the willing human being, that about the “Reality of Freedom” in the second part of the book towards the knowing human being. Both ideations therefore run absolutely counter to a literal superficial understanding of the text. The basic stance of the first part is very clearly marked by the passages already cited: that a “complete justification” for the idea of the freedom of the will can be attained, “if only first the realm of the soul is found, on which the free will can be unfolded”, and that the first part of the work describes “intuitive thinking as inward spiritual activity of the human being.” The basic thought that runs through these deliberations is one of productive-coproductive cognition that is not confronted with a ready-made pre-given reality (either reproducing or even only affected), but that lets this emerge in its process under its own co-emergence. This presentation appeals to the willingness to observe and think and is therefore a schooling of the will, suited to a modern mode of consciousness, a path of training on the meditative culture of spiritual activity. The second part of the work dedicated to “The Reality of Freedom” turns on the other hand to the cognizant human being.  It gives an overview about the motivational structure of volition and how a new cultural impulse arising out of free deeds can be integrated into the old nature-like and nature-based world. Such a situational knowledge is required by the human being, who is developing  his cognitional practice, if he does not wish to wind up on detours or false paths.

That the chapter about “The Idea of Freedom” belongs to the second part of the work is consistent with this characteristic. The chapter about “The Human Individuality” that corresponds with it (according to the symmetry of the textual construction developed in the following pages) is found on the other hand in the first part of the work. The through his cognitional practice self-realizing human individuality becomes fully conscious of the essential features and significance of its deeds when it apprehends the idea of freedom in a world and man overlapping overview.

What is noteworthy by both afore-mentioned cited attributes, which Rudolf Steiner himself has given about the relation between both main parts, is the symmetry of his remarks. The statement in the preface to the new edition at the beginning of the text  corresponds with the second addition that Rudolf Steiner added to the third part of his work. After the remarks in the preface to the new edition about the two fundamental questions  that determine the arrangement of the content and composition of his work, he proceeds to indicate its relation to the spiritual world of experience. He designates the task that he gave himself as the proof “to show that open-minded consideration simply of the two questions I have indicated and which are fundamental for every kind of knowledge, leads to the view that man lives in the midst of a genuine spiritual world.” He who strives for certainty in the realm of the spiritual world of experience will not be able to do without this justification.

In the second addition that Rudolf Steiner placed at the end of his book, this remark corresponds to the following, “In intuitively experienced thinking man is carried into a spiritual world also as perceiver. Within this spiritual world, whatever confronts him as percept in the same way that the spiritual world of his own thinking does will be recognized by him as a world of spiritual perception. This world of spiritual perception could be seen as having the same relationship to thinking that the world of sense perception has on the side of the senses. Once experienced, the world of spiritual perception cannot appear to man as something foreign to him, because in his intuitive thinking he already has an experience which is purely spiritual in character. Such a world of spiritual perception is discussed in a number of writings which I have published since this book first appeared. The Philosophy of Freedom forms the philosophical foundation for these later writings. For it tries to show that the experience of thinking, when rightly understood, is in fact an experience of spirit.” 

           


3

This means that whoever recognizes and senses the connection between reality experience and freedom, becomes conscious of the spirituality of reality and that of his own being as well as his spiritual task. An inward spiritual perception is disclosed to him, in which at the same time he himself is pronounced. If this perception, which is at the same time a pronunciation, is to be called “word”, then the following statement is valid: In the cognition of the natural world the human being perceives its spiritual essence, by knowingly  pronouncing it, man perceives and speaks the “word” that in him longs to be pronounced, but that cannot pronounce itself. It is the word of reality. In the apprehension of the spiritual world in his intuitive thinking, man perceives how this spiritual world pronounces itself in him by virtue of him pronouncing it: again, he perceives and speaks the “word”  that wants to give itself to him, but that he can only make his own by his own activity. It is the word of freedom. By virtue of the fact that man perceives and speaks the “word” of reality and the “word” of freedom, he perceives the “word” of his own true being and begins to give it the individual configuration that can only be attained by individuals. He begins to speaks his own word. Between both parts of “The Philosophy of Freedom” sounds as its secret middle that Word which cannot be written down, but only done and experienced, the unifying word of reality and freedom sounding together in the human word-in-essence [or Logos] that is perceived and at the same time spoken.


Rudolf Steiner himself referred to this word character of “The Philosophy of Freedom”: its first part has a consonantal, its second part a vowel character. This can be understood when one considers that all linguistic sounds arise from a combination of articulation and aspiration. The characteristic of the single sounds, however, is determined by the predominance in expression of either one of these components. By the consonants the articulative aspect is predominant, by the vowels the aspirational. Within the characteristic realms, the mixing ratios of both components are, independent of the predominant basic characters, again different. The setting of the articulative organs corresponds in their gesticulational character  to the human metabolism in its relation to the external world, especially the grasping, grabbing movements. The stream of breath coming from within the human organism is unfolded corresponding to the psycho-spiritual experiences of the human being, corresponding to its experiential attitude. Accordingly, the consonants take on predominantly sound imitating, phonetic functions, the vowels predominantly interjectional, experiential ones. This corresponds to the fact that the first part of the work, which deals with the apprehension of reality, has a consonantal basic character, whereas the content of its second part, which deals with the expression of the true human being as a breathing- out in freedom while at the same time a breathing-in of one’s own spirituality, is ascribed a basic vowel character. The true, the synchronically perceived and spoken word-in-essence [Logos] is the harmony of the consonantal and vowel basic character of the state of being.  


4

The afore-mentioned indications give insight into important compositional attributes of the work.

In a true work of art, form and matter mutually determine, even create each other. The form is not imprinted on matter from outside, but taken from it itself, it is visualization of its inner contexts, its spiritual fabric. The form reacts in turn also to the matter by determining in what way it is ordered and arranged. On the other hand, the matter can only be perceived and observed in detail in a certain formal or presentational frame of mind. This disposition may obviously not be fixed by certain results that are pre-determined, it must instead be capable of assuming pure readiness and many modifications. Then its encounter with the matter reacts again to itself, progressively leading the formative process to its final configuration. In this way, the material process and the formative process in a true work of art permeate each other.

These general features of every true work of art would have to be demonstrated in “The Philosophy of Freedom”, if the designation “Conceptional work of art” is applicable to it. Yet these features must receive their specific mode of appearance through the content of “The Philosophy of Freedom”. The basic characteristics of this content were indicated in the afore-going. From the point of view of conceptional art creation they can be designated as follows:

Since the content and matter of both main parts are in a way inversely related to each other, this would result in the formal principle of an arrangement of its separate chapters integrated in reciprocal relations. This correspondence, however, could not be a mirror-image, but much rather in the sense of an inversion a counter-image. The content would thereby come, on the one hand, again in the form of the arrangement to expression and, on the other hand, the formal principle would determine the structure or layout of the presented content. Hereby attention is drawn to the expected arrangement of the separate parts of the texts. Since it is furthermore understood that the course of progression in both main parts runs in different directions, something similar  may be expected from the course of the presentation, thus the succession of the chapters. For the cognitional process traces how the human being comes forth out of reality. The libertarian process, on the other hand, calls forth a new reality from the human being. Thus with respect to the human being, these processes have different directions. A third content and matter related and at the same time formal attribute follows therefrom that “The Philosophy of Freedom” is an anthropology. For it describes in which way the human being stands in reality, and which new reality he can call forth through his self-formation. From this it follows  that the presentational principle would have to be the nature of the human being in a twofold manner resulting from the  twofold relationship of the human being to reality. Yet it would be wrong and contradictory to the nature of the process of conceptional art to assume that Rudolf Steiner would have made a certain representation of the nature of the human being into a formal presupposition and to have used its schema for the lay-out of his material.  Rather, in the sense of the true artistic mutually permeation of matter and form, it may be assumed that the different relationship  of the human being to reality and to freedom does not only come to the fore in the content but also in the manner of presentation in each single case from the matter itself.

Herewith three attributes of the art of presentation  are referred to: arrangementcourse and principle, in which matter and form in mutual permeation are functionalized. By means of the method of psychic observation of the text it can be ascertained whether it does really exhibit these attributes.


5

This is the place to insert a note on the nature of psychic observation or introspection. [1] The subtitle of “The Philosophy of Freedom” is, as can be read on the title page, “Results of Psychic Observations According to the Method of Natural Science“. These observations pertain to the unobserved part of our normal spiritual or mental life. They raise our continually subconscious participation in the construction of reality into consciousness. There is no object, no matter how insignificant, of which the shape is not determined by spiritual formative  forces. We  continually participate in executing this formative process with the formative forces of our thinking. Yet it is only by psychically observing or introspection of the cognitional process that we become fully conscious of our share in reality. In the co-formation of the reality surrounding us,  we construct at the same time the reality of our own spiritual being. Psychic observation  therefore illuminates a twofold unconscious awareness, namely that of our surrounding reality as well as that of our own reality. Just as in the case of every configuration (Gestalt) of our outer or inner world, we also partake subconsciously in the formative construction of a conceptional work of art. If we make ourselves conscious of this construction through psychic observation, we then participate in the creative, thus free work of a thought-constructor or conceptionalist. We do not only hear explanations about freedom, but we are co-executors of a free deed in great style. The often expressed demand  that the presentation of “The Philosophy of Freedom” should be  clarified by examples is fulfilled in a most generous manner through the conceptional artistic organization of “The Philosophy of Freedom”.  Whoever desires an example of the nature of freedom and of free deeds need only partake in the observation of the conceptional formative process through which “The Philosophy of Freedom” came about.  He then acquires much more than just an indirect elucidating example, for he turns himself into a co-executor of a free deed and is cognizant of it.

Who thereupon with a tone of disappointment asks whether  this freedom is “only” of an aesthetic nature, must concern himself with the answer that conversely everything truly free is aesthetic.  Because only those deeds are free that are done for their own sake out of creative (moral) intuitions. Who subsequently now asks of what use these deeds then are, must face a possibly even more disappointing answer. “Useful” in a higher sense is namely only what occurs for no other external use, thus in this sense “useless”.  Or conversely: what is done for reasons of carrying out something useful (for example out of obedience to some sort of moral maxim) thus not free, is in a higher sense “useless”.  For the meaning of freedom is the development of hitherto completely unknown new faculties of thinking and willing, of a new type of consciousness and humanity, the genesis of a new hominid. There can be no other meaning of human life than this spiritual, the natural superelevating generational succession, the self-generation in the true sense of the word. For the repetition of something already present would be absurd, the servitude under a natural or moral necessity unworthy. Modern natural science has released an irreversible, steadily enhancing  conscious awareness. This conscious awareness can no longer tolerate an organization of the life of society, whose basic principle is not the answering down to the latest details of the question of the meaning of human existence. This answer can ascribe this meaning not to putting the creative faculties of the human being into the service of his material needs, rather only to their service towards his free creative power. Whoever in the future does not envisage with every measure within the social sphere the free unfoldment of the human faculties as the highest and solely valid goal,
does not serve the march of progress, but the relentless catastrophe’s, which must emerge from the growing indignation of forces that, although undeveloped, seek to violently discharge themselves. They sense the inhumanity of every sort of unfreedom, be it instinctively yet with unrelenting violence. 

Let no one object that this line of approach is then rigidly determined after all and that “freedom” is therefore just another word for the categorical imperative for a certain mode of action. Whoever judges in this way has completely misunderstood these deliberations. For the principle of creative, thus not utilitarian unfoldment has no objective content, but solely that of sharpening psychic observation for the individual nature of the human being, and therefore does not in the least concern a general principle. To create institutions which, in a positive sense, give room to the most possible all-round unfoldment of free  human beings through enhancing the gaze for their uniqueness, through the trust in their productivity and the provision of all necessary basics, and which, in a negative sense, deters them from  everything that goes against this, only such institution can be considered progressive, worthy of human dignity and social. Only when along with each measure the question is answered correctly how thereby the needs of human beings are put in the service of the development of free faculties and not, the other way around,  the latter enslaved in the service for the production of their needs, only then can there exists any hope for the future of humanity. Everything else must necessarily lead to always greater evils and incidents, to the loss of all security and the disappearance of trustworthiness. Only the knowledge of freedom, the love for the unfoldment of free spirits and the trust in the spirit of freedom, which wants to spread among humanity, gives in the face of the volcanic seething harm’s way any prospect for the survival of the world. Fateful beyond all measures would be the collaboration with the forces of evil through all sorts of stop-gap solutions for the improvement of mere details. They will only prolong the evil and thereby increase it. The end would have to be the war of all against all or the enslavement of all through the violence of the very few.

These remarks wanted to show what unique significance can be ascribed to psychic observation. It has after all the task through opening the mind’s eye for reality and humanity to convey the answer to the basic question of our times, the question about the meaning of our existence.

However, one will not only expect information about the effect or merit of psychic observation but also about its nature.  This answer can best be given in a generic form. In the observation of thinking, the human being becomes conscious of his faculty to bring forth something based on its own laws (namely the thought-contents).  This bringing forth is at the same time a form of gazing, for it is an exchange-of-being, a knowing of oneself in what is known. The known (the thought-content) is, however, at the same time also the connection with all world phenomena. If thought activity is aroused, but only for it to be held back, thus withholding itself from the transition into the thought-contents and thereby into the world of percepts, which it is capable of permeating, then comes about what is called a thinking gaze, observation or attention, thus a self-reflecting consciousness. Psychic observation is a form of gazing or contemplation, not communicative thinking. Because it keeps the gap between itself and its objectivities open, it is by stemming the forces called upon to bridge that gap the faculty of becoming conscious of the unconnected, incoherent  that nevertheless in its enigmatic nature announces itself, thus the pure perceptual. One is left with a considerably deceptive mistake by maintaining that a pure percept is only capable of being perceived in exceptional states of mind or by a never definitely operational reduction process of eliminating all conceptional correlations (which only has an interpretational significance). The pure percept is rather a given that is in each case exposed to the thinking gaze and as such always capable of being observed.  It is always the as yet unconnected  within the complex of the already connected. Without this unconnected element there would be no starting point for thinking, no cognitional progress.  One can therefore conversely also designate the pure percept as the in each case sensed starting point in the connective process. It is therefore, just as the exchange-of-being in thinking and the formative construction through thinking, a permanent on-going experience, yet one that is sunk into the subconscious and only to be raised from the consciousness underground through psychic observation.

Psychic observation therefore appears for one’s own gaze in a twofold manner. It conveys, on the one hand, the answer to the most pressing riddle, the question of  meaning. It is, on the other hand, the gaze on the numerous riddles continually surrounding us, the pure percepts.

To unearth the meaning of the addition “According to the methods of natural science” on the title page of “The Philosophy of Freedom” would require extensive deliberations.[2] It concerns the way judgements are formed, thus ascertaining the truth. The complete epistemological basic work of Rudolf Steiner is devoted to this difficult problem. Here only this much can be said about it, that this addition states that the connection of concepts  with the observed percepts in the formation of judgments may not proceed on the basis of presuppositions, may thus not lead to hypotheses. Instead, the formation of representations or mental images that is expressed in the formation of judgments would have to be determined only by that which in each case is perceived. The formation of representations may therefore not proceed from the judging subject but only from the perceived object – it would therefore have to be the result of a judgmental experiment, the decision of which is not made by the “judge”, but by the percept in the form of the acceptance, i.e. the individualization of the concept offered to it..

6

Let us now put “The Philosophy of Freedom” to the test with regard to the conceptional art feature of the arrangement. For this purpose we turn to the two main parts “The Science of Freedom ” and “The Reality of Freedom”. The third part “The Final Questions”, which summarizes the work, shall later on become the object of this examination.

Both main parts are divided into seven chapters. The method of arrangement, which in the fore-going was already demonstrated for the later added parts of the text, can also be demonstrated to be the case for both main parts. In the fore-going, attention was drawn to the correspondence between the contents of both parts in the form of an inversion of the objective references in their relation to the human being. A conceptional art procedure would cause the content related correspondences to appear as formal attributes in the lay-out of the text. That this is indeed the case shall now be explicated.

Chapter I, the first chapter of the first part, corresponds in the sense indicated to chapter XIV. The titles of the two chapters read: “Conscious Human Action” and “Individuality and Species”. Though his conscious action, the human being  raises himself above the instincts and drives that are generically active within him and above the collective desires and aspirations of the social groups that he belongs to. The line of gaze thereby turns, starting from the natural and social conditions in which the individual human being lives, to the latter itself. This corresponds to the questioning central to the first part of the text as to the bedding of the human being in the general reality and his emergence therefrom. In his conscious action the human being releases himself, however, not only from the reality surrounding him that forms a part of his own nature, thereby determining his position within its realm. He also reacts to his environment and above all to the social sphere which envelops him and in which he himself is an active producer of reality. This is the leading point of view of the second part and comes to expression in chapter XIV. As may be recognized, the formal arrangement of the first and last chapter of both main parts correspond to the content related correspondence in the polarity of what they express. Form and content mutually determine one another, the formal representational decisions are derived from the essential nature of the contents,  and the formal arrangement reacts at the same time to the latter itself, in that they are displayed  in a certain progression – from which, on their part, certain compositionally determined suggestions arise as a result for the participatory understanding of the reader.

The same correspondences can be demonstrated for the following chapters.

Chapter III (“Thinking in the Service of World Conceptions”) corresponds according to the arrangement under consideration to Chapter XII (“Moral Imagination [Darwinism and Morality]”). The human being can only become aware of the significance that his thinking in the service of forming world conceptions has, when he becomes fully conscious of the conceptional share of his experiences. This is, however, during the normal soul life of the present-day human being absolutely not the case. It is true, with some reflection he can at any time make the omnipresence of his thinking in every one of his observations and activities clear to himself. Notwithstanding, it is due to the spiritual lethargy, which is no doubt the most outstanding trait of character of present-day humanity, the forgotten part of normal soul life. The observation of thinking, the application of thinking to the latter itself, the self-awakening of the sleeper sunk in thought, is in contrast an exceptional state of mind. In this mindset, it becomes clear that each living moment owes its content to that ne’er resting conceptional weaving that adopts all things in its meshwork. Our waking state of consciousness does indeed originate through the slumping of this consciousness-forming factor into the subconscious. It is only to the exceptional state of super-wakefulness  that it displays its significance: there is no reality without connectedness, thus without the participation of spiritual formative forces. However, these cannot be perceived but only to begin with become semi-conscious through our co-operating them: our daily-active share in them, our everyday bread, appears in the effect of their activity as the formative character of the contents of our consciousness, of our corporeality in the latter. But only in their super-wakeful self-apprehension do we become aware of these formative forces as fully conscious processes.

The viewpoint here is again the relationship of the human being to the supposedly pre-given reality surrounding him. In this chapter it becomes especially clear that the human being takes a step in his development when he makes this relationship clear to himself. He acquires thereby a state of consciousness over which he does not have command without effort,  but that instead he must actively bring about through his own exertion.

Chapter XII does not deal with an exceptional state of cognition with respect to the surrounding reality, but, in line with the inverted relation of the parts, with an exceptional state of action. Such a state, like its preparation, is “moral imagination”. The latter draws the driving forces and motives of action not from representations and normality’s  that are under the influence of the organism of the human being, and neither from the conditions of his natural and social environment, but from the inventive faculty of his intuitive thinking. The latter determines solely out of itself the source and goal of our action. The exceptional state of cognition places us in a relationship to the world, which has become what it is and out of which we come forth. In accordance with the inverted relation, the exceptional state of action concerns the relation we as free human beings have to a world that came forth out of us. Just as the exceptional state of cognition the one of action brings about a progression in human development. Human morality is therefore a continuation of natural law by constituting a higher state of development then can be attained trough the forces of natural and social-collective evolution. This continuation, however, is not linear  but an inversion of the original relation of Man to nature. Yet this free morality is a continuation of a natural development, since the latter forms its base. Natural development is in this sense active, because it gives rise out of its domain to a human organism, which in its present state initially secludes all spirituality, but that, just by virtue of the fact that this organism is repressible, makes a free, progressive reunion with the spiritual world possible. A complete or holistic theory of evolution must therefore also include the continuation of the natural development into human morality. That is why this chapter has the subtitle “Darwinism and Morality”. The opposition of both corresponding chapters thereby makes the noteworthy perspective relation (that is valid for both main parts of the work) especially clear: during the exceptional state of cognition  a (psychic-spiritual) action comes to the fore, while the characterizing of the exceptional state of action turns to cognition.

The influence of compositional considerations on Rudolf Steiner’s presentation becomes especially clear from the way Chapter XII is positioned within the overall context. One would after all much rather expect its content in the place of Chapter X, since it is a logical continuation of Chapter IX (“The Idea of Freedom”). However, the conceptional contexts in a conceptional work of art in the sense of logical conclusions are not decisive, but as formative forces that become active through the reciprocal reaction of matter and form.

Chapter IV (“The World as Percept”) corresponds to Chapter XI (“World Purpose and Life Purpose”) . The relation between both chapters can at best be designated by distilling the theory of representationalism from it (that is only completely developed in Chapter V “Knowing the World”). The best understanding can thereby be attained of the compositional context of the complete work that is worth noting. Phenomenological representationalism is one of the most significant results of Rudolf Steiner’s epistemology; however, it requires considerable research efforts in order for it to be fully completed. In connection with the deliberations concerning the perceptual realm, the question must arise as to the transition between concept and percept. The transitional question, i.e. the question how and in which way percept and concept are connected is in fact the most important question of cognition, a pivotal point around which all other cognitional questions revolve. Because of this central position it warrants the greatest attention.

Since percept (devoid of context and coherence) and concept (the logical world of connections) initially confront each other as incompatible contradictions, and since knowledge is only possible when they are capable of being connected, there must be a link between them conveying the transition from one to the other. This link is the representation in the manner it appears to psychic observation. Rudolf Steiner’s genetic representationalism stands in coarse contrast  to the illusionistic views of present-day science. One knows today in general only representative representations, representing the past (as memory-related representations), the future (as related to goals, expectations etc.) and (as imaginative representations) themselves only representing what is represented. Rudolf Steiner has on the contrary demonstrated that the representational representations are only forms derived from the actual representation-forming  process. This is one of the most admirable findings of his science of cognition. The original representation-forming process constitutes the transition between percept and concept that is central to all cognition. General concepts are namely not abstract silhouettes but formative forces of formless perceptual matter. Form can be incorporated in the latter from their vital fluidity, because they can adapt themselves to the formless matter due to their ductility, and while forming the latter can at the same time be formed by it, without forfeiting their typical character. This formative ductility or morphological plasticity of general concepts conveys their transition to the percepts and leads to the formation of representations within that which is perceived. After the connection of the concept apple with the percepts that we receive from a certain apple, we not only have the general concept, which is capable of countless objectified forms of appearance (or objective imaginations) at our disposal, but, as determined by a certain perceptual realm, also its transitional form.  The latter is indeed the representation of the apple and can, after the transition was made to its representational form, be reproduced, remembered. The representational representation, however, is preceded by the inherent representation within the perceptual correlate that retains it. The inherent representation does not represent an object, but constructs it in the first place, is structured with it and in it. The many questions connected with the transitional problem  (e.g. the one whether a transition is made in accordance with reality, the “criterion of the truth”) cannot be touched upon here, since the task of this publication is not primarily one of cognitional science, but to demonstrate attributes of cognitional aesthetics. Yet it is only by viewing the great epistemological problems developed here in this context that it is made entirely clear why the chapters under consideration occupy the compositional center of both main parts.

For this reason the merely indicated epistemological problems must be pursued a little further. Without turning psychic observation to the process of forming representations, it cannot be understood what role the percept plays within the cognitional process. The representation-forming process, however, makes this apparent: the percept is, in contrast to the universalizing, contextualizing concept, the individualizing element of reality. For it ties the fluid concept down to a single case. The process of forming representations is therefore not only characterized as the transition between percept and concept, but also as both of these elements that are connected in it.

Another remark must, however, be added here that first succeeds in clarifying the central compositional function of both these chapters to a sufficient degree. The individualization that takes place through the formation of representations is also the formation of the human being’s own spiritual nature. For the human being does not receive the conceptional part of cognition as is the case with the perceptual share without his own doing. Instead, the human being fulfills this conceptional part while concurrently the human being’s spiritual nature is fulfilled within it. Through the observation of this concurrence the human being becomes conscious of the fact that his spiritual nature rests in the bosom of the spiritual world. Through the observation of the formation of representations, the human being further more becomes conscious of the fact that he can and must himself fashion his own spiritual predisposition through interaction with the physical world. Observing the representation therefore imparts information about the most important questions of cognition and experience – and in fact not only as indirect knowledge merely indicating its object, but as direct experience proving itself. These questions concern the meaning of human life in the physical world, thus the meaning of incarnation and the way it is integrated in the general course of world events. As is made apparent through psychic observation of the formation of inherent representations, the meaning of incarnation is the autogenesis or self-forming emergence of an individual yet universal I-being, spread out in the spiritual world. Since spiritual processes do not come forth from “material” processes, but the latter from spiritual processes (for all contexts are of a spiritual nature), individualization originates (as confirmed by psychic observation) in contact with the physical-material world, but not through the latter. That is why an individualization already present at the birth of a human being cannot be explained by the material components of heredity. Instead, it must indeed be attained in a previous life on earth in contact with the material that the hereditary stream provides, but it cannot have been formed by the latter. Moreover, further progress of individualization must be acquired by means of further connections with the physical world, thus through further incarnations. This is what psychic observation of the formation of inherences reveals as one’s own view.

From here on, one now also acquires an understanding of what is covered by Chapter XI. And only now does the compositional context of both corresponding chapters because of their mutual share in the representational theory become fully apparent. For the eleventh chapter also deals with a representational problem.

Chapter XI proceeds from an analysis of the teleological concept of purpose. In a causal natural context previous events determine successive ones, while in a purposeful action its goal (thus something lying ahead) gives the direction for the measures relevant to it. Even though it might be objected that purposeful representations precede purposeful actions (which incidentally is only the case for schematic, not for creative actions, in the course of which the formative impulses are only gradually formed) this objection disregards the formation of the purposeful representation. For the latter, it is characteristic that the human being can direct  his action contrary to the course of nature. That is why the application of the concept of purpose to natural processes is on the one hand anthropomorphically wrong, on the other hand a blurring of the basic differences which distinguish natural events from human actions. When Rudolf Steiner was writing this chapter he was able to ascertain that the wrong concept of purpose was gradually disappearing in the scientific world. In modern biology, however, the teleological notion is emerging again in a peculiar new form. For present-day science wants to make itself and the rest of mankind believe that only those forms of organisms can survive that have adapted themselves to the environment, i.e. that have been equipped with a purposeful (physical) organization. This purposefulness, as is maintained, is indeed not planned, but originated in a lottery of chance through blind forces. But what is not the result of planning is, cannot be called teleological – and nothing is gained for the merely factually ascertained correspondence of the organisms with their environment by pinning a label on them with a wrong word.
           
Therefore one can neither ask what task a human being has to fulfil on the basis of any sort of goal conveyed to him, no matter whether one regards a natural or a spiritual world occurrence as its progenitor. The task that corresponds to his spiritual nature he can only set himself. The full significance of human self-determination can only be understood against the background of the theory of representationalism  drawn up in the fourth chapter. By living in the physical world the human being learns to individualize. This life is the school of individualization preparing  him for free individualization, for the forming of representations fashioned by his moral fantasy and through which he creatively determines the technical execution of his actions. They do not have representative but prospective character and, although neither derived from inherent representations, they do presuppose the practical experience gained from the forming of inherences. In the process of learning, the procedure of which is the formation of inherences (shapes), the human being obtains the periphery of his life’s experiences (representationals), whose significance is not repetitive routine, but the growing faculty for free design (project design).

Henceforth the correspondence between both chapters under their simultaneous reversal of direction of their described sequence of events becomes readily apparent. Reality is the school of inherences and representationals that the human being can only acquire through self-schooling efforts, when he compiles the material offered to him by the school of life in psychic observation. In this way he leads himself through the educational grades of his incarnation. Thereby he acquires the abilty to design his own lot. Representational and projective representations characterize the content related directions of both inversely corresponding chapters. Man cannot derive  the purpose of his life (his destination) from a purpose of the world prior to his action. Instead, through the free determination of his life’s aims he gives the world a new purpose. From mentally witnessing the representational execution Rudolf Steiner turns the direction of his presentation to an evaluation of the projection procedure in its significance for the world.

Chapter V (“Knowing the World”) corresponds to Chapter X (“Freedom Philosophy”). The states of consciousness that are conveyed through our physical organism are radically different from the state of consciousness that we acquire in cognition. For the percepts  conveyed by our nervous-sense system follow one another in an unconnected succession. They come about by the fact that our organism suppresses the spiritual content of the world phenomena. They do not originate (as is maintained by the present-day, illusionistic-phenomenological psychology and epistemology) through affecting the subject but through decomposition of the object. Under the influence of this decompositional effect are also our percepts that we perceive by ourselves, they also appear in the same conceptional disconnectedness as the others. As soon however as within the percepts of ourselves thinking appears (as something that at first is also observed), it causes that difference through which we confront all other precepts in their intrinsic existence. For it equips us as the creator of connections initially with the need to look for context, of which we become conscious by the raising of our questions. To the extent that we become aware of the aptitude of this in our emergent thinking for making transitions, we attain the faculty to apply it in order to find the sought-after connections, to cognize. Cognition is possible, because we suppress in thinking the despiritualizing effects of our organism and because we can furthermore use the transitional aptitude of its concepts to return the spiritual content to the percepts. In that way we place instead of our physically determined existence our spiritually shaped existence, whose art of construction we do indeed have to learn in the school of embodiment, but which we can only bestow on ourselves. This sort of human being is not a physically enchained but a spiritually liberated one, not a physical humanity, but a spiritual humanity.

The faculty of thinking appears according to psychic observation to have a double function. On the one hand it separates us from world phenomena, on the other hand it connects us with them. Since it can only establish the context of what is unconnected because it is an intrinsic closed context, we integrate ourselves in cognition in the context of the universe. We attain through thinking not only our fully conscious individual existence, which is conveyed physically since it can only appear within the percepts from which it sets itself apart. We attain through thinking in knowing the world also a total existence in the universe that is bodily independent, since it comes about through the suppression of the despiritualizing effects of our bodily organization.

Chapter X is once again the correspondence in contrast. The total existence in cognition is the great expansion of human consciousness. It is an all-encompassing unified consciousness: the world is a spiritual unity, therefore the world view that emerges from true cognition is monism. Monism, however, is also freedom philosophy. Because the human being experiences thinking not as something effecting him, but as something that he effects. And this something that he effects is at the same time independent from all outer influences, only existent through itself. It gives the cognitional human being not only the greatest expansion of his consciousness, but also grant him its most condensed concentration. This is the case, because  thinking comes forth, as from a radiation point, from the intrinsic activity of the human being. This radiation point is the idea of freedom. Because when it is realized, the human being is not under the influence of external formative forces, such as is the case in those parts of his being through which he belongs to nature. Instead, the human being causes these formative forces to emerge from the acts of his freedom. Freedom is the faculty for moral intuitions, i.e. for generating conceptional formative forces and beyond that their individualization through moral phantasy or imagination. Freedom is therefore the most content-rich idea, because as the conceptional productivity per se it encompasses all ideas, it is the center that harbors them and out of which  they come forth. It is, as it were, the inversion of spiritual humanity as human spirituality. As such, both compositional related chapters again correspond to each other in contrast. To designate these cognitional experiences that appear to psychic observation, it may be permitted to use the following graphic images.  The cognitional human being sees his true nature, his total existence spread out above him as a firmament, it is the starry heaven above him. As a being acting out of freedom, he becomes aware of how the stars of the spiritual world light up in his own soul. Their light is lit from his freedom spirit, it is the celestial heaven concentrated in the freedom center in him.

In view of the state of present-day humanity it seems to be a much too mild judgment by naming such images idealistic intoxications. They seem to deserve to be discarded as irresponsible self-delusions and wicked deceptions. They are after all difficult to protect from the objection that they divert stringent self-knowledge and no-nonsense  activity to the flagged marveling at a fata morgana.

Yet he who so judges forgets that such images do not say anything about a single person and neither about the humanity of a period, They merely indicate the dimensions within which the seeker for himself must orientate himself and within its field his development lies. They  reject at the same time, however, the other images of inhumanity (the destructiveness of the world and the animalism of people) that form the yoke under which the present-day materialistic science wants to force humanity – under the pretext to lead them for the price of inward desolation to a state of perfected material happiness.

Chapter VI (“The Human Individuality”) corresponds with Chapter IX (“The Idea of Freedom”). In the sixth chapter it is described how the individual spiritual life of human beings moves as a pendulum to and fro between two poles that in the fore-going were already designated as the existential modes of the human being. His individual spiritual experience expands in witnessing the general course of world events and concentrates itself in his own existence gathered around the focal point of freedom. This experience could also be called a spiritual breathing.  “A true individuality shall be one who with his feelings reaches furthest into the ideational realm,”  who therefore also harbors the ideational sphere most intimately within his own soul life.
           
Herewith the human individuality is described in the way it appears to psychically observant cognition. Chapter IX is in this respect again the correspondence in the reversal of the direction of the object-related presentation. It does not describe how the human individuality emerges from the general state of the world, but how it positions itself in it. It is not de meditative direction towards the process of individualization in its valid social an general meaning. Both chapters, however, have the same leading points of view, namely the unification of two polarities in human experience and behavior. The polarity of total and individual existence in the sixth chapter corresponds to the polarity of motive and driving force in the ninth chapter. These are polarities because they designate the goals (motives) and origins (driving forces) of human action. Through his motives the human being connects himself to general world events, his driving forces belong to his own nature from which they emerge.  Yet it is only in unfree action that motive and driving force face each other as two intrinsically different elements. In free action, however, both of them are connected in a process which corresponds to the unification of individual and universal experience within the attitude and unfoldment of consciousness. For characteristic of a free action is a related exchange, namely that of motive and driving force, a transition of both in one another. Also this interplay can be compared to a swinging or breathing. Unfree action, however, is split; on the one hand motives are imposed on it from the outside,  while on the other hand its driving forces are under the influence of the human organism.  In free action, however, both elements share the same composition of the idea. They both belong to the realm of intuition, invention. What is truly new is surfaced from the hidden shafts of the idea to the light of day – and what has its origin there is also the ultimate goal to be realized. A true individuality reaches in its individual cognitive experiences the heights of the wholly self-determined ideational sphere, i.e. it experiences thereby a sphere that while, repelling all subjective prejudices, sympathies and antipathies as well as schemes, participates in it with the strongest of emotions. Free impulses are in the same way the most intimate expression of the actions of a personality that at the same attain the pure, in no way subjectively restricted height of the spiritual world. This vital breathing stream of freedom bridges the gap between the coercion of commandments and the compulsion of the human organism. The idea of freedom experienced and lived, not only adopted as an item of knowledge, is itself the greatest example of this state of mind. For as the freedom of cognition, it has as content the emergence of an individual human being from the general world of ideas. As the freedom of action, it has as content the emergence of de ideational world from the individual human being and thereby not only the formation of the natural but also of the ideational world itself. Formative impulses after all arise through human freedom that, apart from their effect on the natural world, are intrinsically significant because through them appears a principle of evolution on the stage of creation that would not become manifest without the human being. An example of the sort of consciousness and mode of action of freedom is the forming of a knowledge community, whose members set themselves this goal by nurturing their soul life through the psychic observation of their volitional thinking,  thereby developing in themselves the sources of this community-building. Here too the driving force becomes the motive, while the motive arouses the original forces flowing to it. And the use of a road map too can be the freely chosen motive of completely individual impulses – a form of action that from the knowledge of the contexts obtains the possibility of individual intervention, while the cognitional blind or visionless will to act fetters itself through the entanglements that it conjures up itself in the first place.

Chapter VII (”Are There Limits to Cognition?” corresponds to Chapter VIII (“The Factors of Life”). The notion of cognitional limits is in principle a contradiction in itself. For cognition is precisely the overcoming of the limits that are based on the nature of the percept. A limit to cognition is after all nothing more than a lack of context. The absence of contexts is part of the nature of percepts, and the creation of contexts is part of the nature of cognition, hence is limitation an attribute of perception and not of cognition and the cognized. One can speak sensibly about limits to percepts, yet not about limits to cognition. For knowledge is the overcoming of the limitations that impose themselves in the percepts. Since the means for overcoming this are concepts that are themselves part of a closed, uninterrupted context and that can only on the basis of their embedment in a continuum perform their service at all, it follows that every real item of knowledge integrates the known in the spiritual unity of the world.  Since that knowledge does not come about because the necessary information from the perceptual side in the specific case at hand is lacking, or because the seeker for information does not possess the necessary cognitional faculty, it cannot be blamed on the knowledge as such and the way it is generated, but is to be explained by the special conditions under which a human being faces the as yet unrecognized percepts.

As a perceiver the human being possess  a consciousness of unconnected singularities, he knows himself only to be such an unconnected singularity among other singularities. Since he becomes conscious of this fact through the emergent thinking in himself, he possess a bodily based self-consciousness. Through his cognition he attains, however, a spiritually based self-consciousness. For he is conscious of the fact that he brings forth his knowledge himself and that within it at the same time he brings himself forth.

In overcoming the limits to the percepts through his cognition the human being emerges from the global context as a spiritual self-conscious individuality. He bestows this mode of existence on himself by reestablishing the interrupted global context in the precepts.

 In Chapter VIII, the first chapter of the second part of the work, after a recapitulation of what is developed in the first part, is to begin with substantiated the distinction between the forces of the human psyche (going back to Tetens) in thinking, feeling and willing.  This recently challenged distinction is confirmed with surprising simplicity by psychic observation. All contents of consciousness are relationships: where these are lacking, consciousness is extinguished. Therefore it is possible to gain an overview about the contents of consciousness  by bringing to mind their logically possible and at the same time observable sorts. On doing so it turns out the human being can refer the percepts to himself, himself to the percepts and within the percepts himself to them, them to himself. The first sort of these relationships we call feeling, the second willing, the third thinking. If one examines furthermore what the relation is between these three relationships, then an unmistakable priority of thinking becomes apparent. Because thinking as activity is volitional and the in the outer world active will is the mobility of the human limb system driven by thinking volition. And only then can the human being refer the world phenomena to himself, i.e. develop emotional experiences, if he has beforehand immersed in them through his thinking, has formed the inherences  through which they gain stature. Feeling is the relationship between his thinking inherent in world phenomena and the existential consciousness that he gives to himself precisely through this thinking. Self-comprehensive thinking is one that becomes conscious of its faculty of auto-genesis and unification that embraces the relationship to the objects permeated by it as well as the latter to itself. Man is not a feeling nor a willing but a thinking creature, i.e. a being that gives itself a spiritual self-consciousness.

In getting to know the world as the overcoming of the limitations it poses, the human being becomes aware that he comes forth as a spiritually conscious being from reality.

In the cognition of his own being, the “factors of life”, his psychic forces, the human being becomes aware that he enters the world stage as a conscious, thinking being, because his feeling and willing are modes of appearance of his thinking. Thinking and representing (in the sense developed here) may not be confused with one another. What is valid for thinking,  may not be transferred to representing, which is rather a mode of appearance of thinking as well.

The lastly viewed opposition of both compositionally corresponding chapters confirms once more the conceptional artistic method of arrangement of the correspondence between both parts in the inversion of the relationship in each case between Man and the world. This type of arrangement is hence demonstrated to be valid for both parts of the work and strictly followed by them from the beginning to the end. 




[1] See H. Witzenmann, “Intuition and Observation” in the work with the same title. Spicker Books, Ca. 1986 (out of print). A partial translation of  “Intuition und Beobachtung” (Part I)  and other essays by H. Witzenmann.
[2] See H. Witzenmann “Ein Weg zur Wirklichkeit – Bemerkungen zum Wahrheitsproblem“ ("A Way to Reality - Comments on the Problem of Truth"), in „Intuition und Beobachtung“, Part II, Stuttgart 1978. 


III. THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN BEING

“The Philosophy Of Freedom” As A Universal Study Of Man/ The Ontological Levels Of Creatures/ The Ontological Levels Of Man/ The Anthropological Outcome


In the fore-going reflections devoted to the basic features of Rudolf Steiner’s  conceptional artistry three characteristic features were differentiated: the (static) arrangement, the holistic principle that determines the latter, and the succession, the apprehensive movement of the reader that with respect to the arrangement follows the dynamically progressing train of thought in the individual parts (chapters). The theme of the preceding chapter was the conceptional art arrangement that for the total overview appears to be static (albeit only understood  in succession). Here must now follow the proof what holistic principle determines this arrangement.

The assumption is obvious that this principle is the nature of the human being. For “The Philosophy of Freedom” as a science of the nature of human cognition, experience and action is an anthropology in great style. It could be called “A General Anthropology of the Science of Reality and Freedom”. Yet it would be erroneous to maintain that certain anthropological views were presupposed by Rudolf Steiner and transferred to his material as a disposition-schema conveniently keeping everything together. Such a procedure would in no way be artistic. It contradicts the artistic archetypal experience of the formative exchangeability of material and form in a process of mutual production that the conceptional artist indeed executes, but in which he at the same time experiences himself as being brought forth by his work.

Therefore it will initially be attempted to sketch an outline of the anthropology contained in “The Philosophy of Freedom”. In the Preface to the New Edition (1918) of the book, Rudolf Steiner accentuates the priority and the basic significance of the anthropological question. He describes it with the following, already quoted  words, “Whether there is a possibility to view the human being in such a way that this view proves to be a support for everything that comes on to the human being through experience or science, but from which he has the feeling that it cannot be self-supporting.” And he designates as one of the main purposes of his work to provide proof, “that there is a view of the human being that can support the remaining knowledge.” He continues that on this basis “a full justification for the idea of the freedom of the will can be attained.” With that, "The Philosophy of Freedom" is explained as a general anthropology, the idea of the human being as its basis and anthropological knowledge as the supporting ground for all cognition.

Rudolf Steiner develops his area of research through psychic observation according to the method of natural science. If this method is applied to the cognitional process, it then appears that the human being is not only the practitioner of his cognition and that the latter thus, as may be assumed, displays the features of his own being, but that humaneness constitutes the general characteristic, the substantial basis-of-being. Not only does the human being in his cognition cause reality to emerge from himself as its human origin by repeating and at the same time transforming it, but he also recognizes how his individual humaneness emerges from the universal human being permeating the world. His universal humaneness is the source and the latter, on its part, the source of a new universe of humanity.


2

That this can be gleaned from the process of cognition through psychic observation may be indicated in the following way.

If the over-all context is now to become apparent, a few preceding remarks must be repeated. The cognitional process is the unification of percept and concept. For psychic observation both elements differentiate themselves as the disconnectedness and therefore formless and, on the other hand, the connectedness and therefore capable of creating form. Their unification can only come about because the conceptional transition, the forming of inherences is possible. This is based on the fact that concepts are types or sorts that can adapt themselves in numerous metamorphoses to the perceptual conditions of cognition. Inherence is proof of the resultant transition, i.e. the constitution of reality (realization) formed in cognition. Inherence is therefore the attribute of the transition out of which shaped being emerges from the perceptual void of reality. In common usage this is called the forming of an inherent judgement. The German [as well as English] speech-form of a judgement also expressly emphasizes the formation-of-being by the so-called copula (link), “The horse is a mammal.” The transition, the connective inherence is formation-of-being, realization in a form-of-being.

Inherences are the copulation of an individualizing and a universalizing component of reality. With that the basic features of two layers of Being are already becoming apparent. Forms in the inorganic world only originate through the fact that their individualizing components (singularities or peculiarities) are determined by the contexts (“forces”) of the field to which they belong. The contexts of this field, which for their part are modifications of the general when-then-context (causality), possess the character of unlimited adaptable types. The metamorphosis of the specific conceptional type is in the inorganic world the adaption of the forces of their total field to the particular inorganic form and thereby at the same time their generic classification in the latter. The metamorphosis, the adaption of the general concepts to their perceptual correspondences is thus on this level a formative occurrence that is peculiar to the process of realization in general, but not peculiar to the specific inorganic structure. It is a different story in the world of organisms. Here the metamorphoses of the formative conceptional types are not, as is the case in the inorganic world, relations between the latter in their totality and their individual forms. Instead, the metamorphoses of the organic realm are specific peculiarities of the individual organisms. The changes of inorganic forms  are therefore are not related to each other in a form-like manner, but are produced at the inorganic structures by “external” forces. This means that they are metamorphoses of the formative types of the whole inorganic field that manifest themselves at their individual forms. The organic metamorphoses are in contrast themselves parts of a formative design. The super-temporal and super-spatial type therefore constructs here its emergent forms in a succession of temporal-spatial metamorphoses. These are thus with regard to the individual structures not, as in the inorganic world, only form-changing but also form-constructing.

Already here it must be pointed out (what remains important for the sequence) that the afore-mentioned observations display three differentiated dimensions of something of a homogenous nature. These three dimensions are world, knowledge and Man (meant as an individual single being). For one recognizes immediately that the displayed attributional contexts as well as those of the objects of cognition are similar to cognition itself. This cannot be otherwise, if cognition is a true awareness of the known and does not only possess the character of a representation or a symbolic setting of the latter. Accordingly, the individualized inherence of types of a total cognitive field (inorganic world) and the typological context of inherences in the construction of individual forms (organic world) as well as the respective attribute-of-being of the cognitional objects in question is similar to the respective attribute-of-execution of the cognitional process in question. By becoming aware through observation of the structural correspondence between knowledge and the known, one becomes however also cognitively  transparent for oneself. For it appears before the eye of the knower that inorganic materiality as well as its organic transformation belong to his own total nature. The psychic observation initially focused on the cognitive process is thus structured in three dimensions.

The forming of inherences or mental representations is only possible on the basis of the typical variability of the concepts, i.e. their universality. These are therefore not identical to their representable metamorphoses, they are irrepresentable. They are formative and at the same time formable, while with regard to the inherences the perceptual shows itself to be unformed and at the same time formative. Everything with regard to an apple is of an unformed-formative nature, while all concepts relevant to it (the concept of the apple itself, that of the skin, of the color, of the smell etc. as well as their reciprocal relationships are of a formative-formable nature. However, in order for inherences to come about not only the transition (transformationality, the ability of concepts to metamorphosize and their solidification in the respective metamorphosis), but also preceding the transition yet another process is necessary. This has its starting-point in a further attribute of the concepts, namely to intrinsically transcend themselves, i.e. to possess the predisposition for metamorphosis. This becomes clear from the fact that concepts are perspectives or viewpoints, and perspectives on what is initially not yet represented (thus in this sense the not yet conceived), on the pure perceptual. For where concepts are lacking, nothing either of a perceptual nature is observed, even though (like for instance in a moment of shock) a vague momentary feeling can foreshadow itself that as an uncertain sense of context is part of the always potential presence of thinking, yet that only with the already further developed perspectives of general concepts (it, something) becomes observationally clear.  General concepts (formative types devoid of images) are thus perspectives, possible viewpoints for the incomprehensible that straight through their transparency is sighted as a not yet attained conceivable. In that way we test on unknown objects (e.g. a machine seen for the first time) our concepts for their perspectible aptitude. Only in the course of such try-outs do the singularities become apparent that through a later understanding can be interpreted by the forming of inherences. This use of concepts with regard to their perspectible aptitude can be called intentionalization. The scholastic concept of intentionality (the self-transcending orientation on an object) was recognized by [the German psychologist] Franz Brentano as the essential attribute of the psychical. Before the conceptional types (general concepts) on the basis of their transformationality in the cognitional process can be inhered (affixed to formative representations), they must be made into perspectives for the as yet unknown perceptual, their intentionability must be used. They must be intentionalized, ensouled. The ensoulment of concepts is for cognition a universally valid procedure and is in every cognitive process just as necessary as their experienceability in the transitional forms of their metamorphoses.  But with regard to the essential structure of singular beings, this ensoulment of the conceptional types appertains only to animals, while with regard to plants and minerals it appears to psychic observation on the one hand as one of its stages, on the other hand as a general objective-structural condition of the process of realization (the realization within certain realms). For as soon as one liberates oneself from the prejudgment that general concepts (formative types) are abstractions (which to be sure is valid for certain areas of representations, but which is with respect to types disproved by psychic observation) one recognizes that reality itself as well as its co-execution in cognition display structurally necessary transitional stages. To these appertain also the internal modes of judging and sighting of concepts, their intentionalities (either specific to the realms of the singular beings). The intentional ensoulments of concepts (the environmental relations of the intraworldly realm) appertain with regard to animals admittedly to the individual example, but they are not specific to the individual but to the genus.

It is only in human consciousness that concepts assume this individual nature, because the human being himself brings them forth.  The concepts thus produced by the human being are not, as is the case with creatures of nature, innate to him: he inspirits them through his own activity. Therefore they are neither group ensouled, but acquire their ensoulment through individual acts, they are individually ensouled.

Psychic observation of the cognitive process shows a fourfold transitional occurrence that can also be designated as a cognitive structure. The four structural stages can be explained by the concepts inherence, metamorphosis, intentionality and actuality. The cognitive stages are at the same time structural stages of the objects of cognition, and indeed partly of the individual recognized shapes, partly of the realms to which they appertain. With Man all four formative stages are united in the individual human being. Again it is apparent that the gaze upon the cognitional structure is divided into three dimensions.


3

The human being shares the structural peculiarities of the creatures of the mineral, plant and animal kingdom, albeit in a manner modified by his humaneness. As a producer of his concepts Man towers above the creatures of nature and their realms. Only by becoming aware of this do we direct our attention to our humaneness: we recognize ourselves as thinking beings. Yet the observations that we can make of the cognitional process are thereby not finished and therefore neither those that we can make of our own nature.

Our ability to bring forth concepts conveys us our sense of self, of the “I” (Ichgefühl). What only unclearly announces itself in our sense of self, becomes apparent in that state of exception through which we turn our thinking activity into an object of observation. Then we do not observe something alien to us, but of our own making, we do not develop alien but self-consciousness. When psychic observation becomes aware of it as self-apprehension, then it confirms the justification of the sense of self.

Yet psychic observation also shows us that our thinking activity cannot proceed arbitrarily,  but is, on its part, directed by what it brought forth itself. We do indeed bring forth the concepts, but in such a way that it corresponds to their own nature, their reciprocal contexts, the general logicality of thinking. The laws of thinking, the spiritually living organism of the archetypes of all structural design, are in the face of our arbitrariness inviolable. Thinking does indeed not impose itself on us, it leaves us free, for we can call it forth or refrain from it. But it appears in the element of our activity as an intrinsic declining, interweaving tapestry-of-being (Wesensweben).  In order to clarify this process one could bring up a comparison that, as all other comparisons, does not apply completely, because it attempts to explain a purely spiritual through a bodily dependent process. When we sing a certain tone, we are the ones bringing it forth. But at the same time we enter into an understanding with a self-explanatory realm. This tone assumes within the acoustic phenomena through its pitch and flank contact a ranking that places it in a certain relation to other tones and the general extensions and conditions of the tonality. The experiencing singer does therefore not feel himself only to be the producer of a mechanically conveyed stream of breath, but more intimately also as the recipient of an inflow, which is why artistic singing is a mutually self-supporting act of both streams. A similar yet bodily independent exchange occurs in thinking. This is, however, a much more embracing process, for it apprehends the whole nature of the human being.  In thinking, the whole human being becomes a song. He sings his own melody that is however one of thinking. Hence the most intimate, essential affinity, spiritual communion, an exchange-of-being not constrained by any divider is experienced in thinking.

As a producer of his concepts, the human being raises himself above the creatures of nature. The self-related condition of consciousness, however, is at this level still corporeal, bodily determined. For the human being becomes aware of his ability to actualize concepts through their application to the sense percepts conveyed to him by his organism. By observing the exchange-of-being with thinking, however, he becomes aware of himself as a purely spiritual being. For in becoming aware of this exchange-of-being the despiritualizing effects of his bodily organization are repressed. In so far as he is capable of raising himself to this state of consciousness through inner activity (taking place indeed not without his body, but against the latter) and observing it, he apprehends himself not as a corporeal self but as a spirit self. He now no longer only intentionalizes his concepts as is the case by their application to the percepts conveyed to him by his bodily sense organs. Instead he is in his own self intentionalized toward something of the nature of a super self.

Proceeding  from this awareness-raising process further perspectives arise on parts or yet to be fulfilled prospects of human nature.  As a spirit self, the human being receives the influx out of which he constructs his nature, not from the physical realm on which his bodily vital functions are dependent.  In the exchange-of-being with thinking, he experiences the influx of the spiritual world that gives of itself in his free deeds by transforming itself in him. He undergoes thus as life spirit the spiritual world expanding around him and at the same time gathering in himself.

Only then does the perspective arise for him on his true nature, on his spiritual humanity. For in his true being, he has a total existence in the universe, in the spiritual one as well as in the natural one permeated by the latter. The spiritual world entered and observed in his thinking is after all a self-contained, completely uninterrupted context. That is why the spiritual exchange-of-being is one that does not attain a total existence, but conversely one that emerges from the latter. How much of this total existence, which psychic observation is shown in its unmistakable nature, can be apprehended is of course a question of personal development.
         Once again, the result of psychic observation is divided into the three dimensions of cognition, the known and human nature.

4

From the psychic observation of the cognitive process pursued according to the method of "The Philosophy of Freedom"  and based on its contents, now results the following anthropological finding (that could also be proven philologically with passages from epistemological works of Rudolf Steiner):

The human sevenfold structure of his being corresponds with that of cognition and the objects. For also the classification of the creatures of nature in the general context of the world proceeds through formative forces that are on their part determined out of the spiritual holistic context. The latter, however, is identical to the true nature of the human being, for the latter apprehends himself in the psychic observation of the cognitional process  as the being that becomes aware of himself in the active exchange-of-being with the spirit and world phenomena.

The sevenfold human nature can be characterized through the following concepts that in the fore-going were developed:

         1. Physical body     - Inherence of the concept: individualization
         2. Etheric body      - Metamorphosis of the concept
         3. Astral body        - Intentionalization of the concept
         4. I (Self)               - Actualization of the concept
         5. Spirit self           - Exchange-of-being with the spirit
         6. Life spirit           - Construction-of-being from the spirit
         7. Spirit man          - Total existence in the universe: universalization

All levels of the reality-structure, thus of the essential nature of Man have a share in each being; the world everywhere is thus holistic, but embraced by the individual being only to the extent of its own ability, yet the latter (i.e. the being) embraced by it (i.e. the world).  This follows from the fact that also the inherences giving shape to the mineral structures are part of the uniform spiritual world, from which they emerge and in which they are embedded in reverse connections.

From the preceding sketch might emerge in which way human nature is the supporting basis for all cognition, to what extent, according to the remarks by Rudolf Steiner with regard to the two “basic questions of human soul life”, there is “a view about human nature that can support all remaining knowledge.” Human nature forms this basis, because, as already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is the basic substance of the world, because the creation of the world is the creation of Man, for Man only emerges from the world to the extent that this is the universal human basis of his individual human nature and the latter is therefore the basis for a new creation of the world.

The view of Man of the anthropology of the science of freedom is at the same time a world view. For psychic observation of the cognitive process apprehends the primordial source of reality in its moment of origin from the self-creative spirit. This is in the element of thinking the human being’s own activity and therein the originality per se in its emergence from the self-induced begin. The psychic observation of the cognitional process, however, does not only apprehend the origin, but also the basis-of-being in the universal, individualizing and from the individualization in a new form remerging human being. Psychic observation leads to the sources of thinking and the grounds of existence in the human being itself. For he is the conception and destination of the world, the archetype that attains, permeates and eclipses all dimensions of being.  [The German philosopher] Schelling said it in this way: “Nature is visible spirit, spirit is invisible nature.” Psychic observation culminates in the experiential knowledge expressed by Rudolf Steiner in one of his “Truth Wrought Words”:

                            If Man knows himself,
                            His self becomes the world.
                            If Man knows the world,

                            The world becomes his self.





IV. TWO MAIN STREAMS IN 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE WORK

Thinking Volition And Volitional Thinking, Their Different Enfoldment/ The Stages Of Volitional Enfoldment As Compositional Forms Of The First And Fourteenth Chapter/ The Stages Of Volitional Enfoldment In The Fourteenth Chapter/ On The Community-Building Function Of Individual Judgments


Before proving the result of the preceding anthropological examination with respect to its suitability for clarifying the conceptional artistry of The Philosophy of Freedom, another train of thought is to be inserted here that may be helpful.

In the fourth lecture of The Study of Man (1919) Rudolf Steiner points to the seven stages of human volitional development. There the following schema can be found:

                   Spirit man                      Resolution
                   Life spirit                       Intention
                   Spirit self                       Wish

                   Consciousness soul                  
                   Rational soul                  Motive
                   Sentient soul                 

                   Sentient body                 Desire
                   Etheric body                   Drive
                   Physical body                  Instinct[1]      

The far-reaching contexts of this schema cannot be pursued here. Yet one viewpoint is to be highlighted, because of its importance for the task at hand.

The adduced schema offers a compendium-like overview about the sphere of the human will. However, it does not say anything about how volitional development proceeds in specific cases. If one poses this question, two basic different modes of appearance of volition immediately come to the fore. For the human being sets as thinker and agent his will in quite different ways into motion. The purest expression of his will is the active bringing forth of thinking, thinking volition (Denkwille). After all, the latter merges without alien supplements completely with its result. The activation of the will in external action is, on the other hand, directed by thinking and subdued by the resistance of the body and the material dealt with. It only implements the thought and is therefore volitional thinking (Willensdenken). Both these processes, the thinking volition and volitional thinking, proceed in different directions through the spheres of the human being, thinking volition in the direction from willing to thinking and volitional thinking in the direction from thinking to willing.

Let us begin by observing the development of thinking volition. One can note that the latter is interpreted in a certain way by the preceding schema. The thinking volition does not only strive to produce concepts but also to permeate the percept with the latter. It proceeds therefore from individual motives (aims) to the percepts in which its goals can be realized. On its way to the percept thinking volition moves through different stages of development. It passes thereby also through different spheres of the human being. For the particular modes of its development can only manifest in certain spheres of the human being. Since it develops in the direction from motive to percept, it begins in the I-ish or ego-related essential sphere of the willing agent. It then desires to reach its goal and enters thereby that human essential sphere designated as sentient body. It finds access to the desired goal by its drive adapted to the latter, through which it enters the human essential sphere of the versatile, adaptable vital forces.  And finally it fuses with the attained goal in the instinctivity of the inherence, that dull consciousness which we have of our physical body when not in state of arousal. For the execution of a willful action corresponds with an extension of our physical corporeality and its dull inherence consciousness.[2] Inherences have the character of instinctivity, since with regard to their origin and nature they only become conscious through psychic observation; for normal consciousness they are only existent in the form of a certain sense of naïve reality.

This sequence of steps of thinking volition, which is at least dimly illuminated by normal conscious, albeit under increasing overshadowment, can only run because it is intertwined with the process of the creation of concepts, conceptualization. To be sure, this process sinks for normal consciousness even deeper into the subconscious, so that it can only afterwards be brought to light by superwakeful  psychic observation  Only with the use of concepts, however, can thinking volition attain its perceptual goal. This goal is for the cognizant thinking volition the structural design permeated by an inherence. The hereby developed, above-mentioned volitional steps of cognition (motive, desire, drive and instinct) originate indeed only in the course of the connection of a concept to a percept. However, from that it may not be concluded that the exchange-of-being with the spirit, thus the connection between thinking volition and the thought-content, without which no substantive thinking is possible, would have to precede the connection between percept and concept. Rather, it concerns an interrelated occurrence. For only when in the course of a formative process, in which observation and conceptualization constantly stimulate each other, the final concept, summarizing all other conceptional links, is individualized, only then also the process of conceptualization is concluded.

Conceptualization, however, can only arrive at its results because Man is a being connected to the allness of the spiritual world and hence from there acquires his intuitions. These are on the one hand associations (Zusammenschlüsse) with the spiritual world, they are on the other hand receptive (aufgeschlossen), they are resolutions (Entschlüsse) to associate with the physical world. Conclusions (Schlüsse)[3] as associations of cognition with the spiritual and physical reality require that common spiritual basis that transcends subject and object, Man and world. That is why in spiritual experience the special conceptional structure, which does not arise until its adaption to the percept, originates from the general accordance of the spiritual world with itself as well with the perceptual world – and not the other way around. Conclusions are therefore prior to judgements and concepts, just as the resolutions pertaining to the forming of conclusions (not to actions) are prior to the intentions and wishes of cognition. For those conclusions and resolutions are the real supports required by them for their unfoldment. Indeed, the desire of the human being wills to overcome in conceptional exchange-of-being the limitation of his bodily organization, to bring himself into spirit man-like accordance with the allness of the spiritual tapestry-of-being. His buoyancy, however, flows to him from the intuitive resolutions which he makes in the spiritual world, from his exchange-of-being with it (as spirit man) and from the way that he (as life spirit) living in the spirit grasps the intentions that are in accord with his own essential condition or soul mood. And it is these in turn which render his spirit self-like wish the power to wrest himself from the obstructive influence of his corporeality. The emergence of particular conceptional structures from the general spiritual world is thus a process intertwined with the individualization of the concepts towards inherences, their formation neither preceding nor succeeding it. Since it is, however, even more withdrawn from conscious awareness than the process of individualization, it is not accessible to psychic observation, in spite of its being intertwined with this process, until afterwards  by the disclosure of the already gained object consciousness.

The motivic element of thinking volition unfolds according to the afore-going from its I-ish origin in the direction of the physically perceptual realm of instinctive inherences. The driving forces of thinking volition originate in the spirit man-like cognitive resolutions that direct their power to the spirit self-like desire in order to override the bodily obstructions.

The steps in the unfoldment of thinking volition, which is cognitively engaged in object structure, can now be indicated as follows: Motive – Desire – Drive – Instinct – Resolution – Intention – Wish (see the schema from The Study of Man by Rudolf Steiner). The same holds true for the involvement of the spheres of the human being.

The observation of volitional thinking, the will expressed in external actions, shows another course of volitional unfoldment. For these, in so far as it concerns modes of conduct that deserve to be called human because they originate from conscious awareness, a process is characteristic that runs contrary to thinking volition. Here the difference becomes apparent that distinguishes both spheres, cognition and action, in every respect. In the preceding deliberations it was articulated that in cognition Man recognizes himself as a being emerging from the world – that conversely he as an agent not only conveys the existing world a new impulse, but beyond that lays the foundation for a new state of the world, the emergence of a new world out of Man.  Therefore, not the contents of knowledge, which pertain to what is already present, are decisive for acting out of knowledge, but the special ability that is developed through the cognition of that which is already present. This is the inventive-creative commitment of the conceptional productivity developed in cognition and its further schooling to free, morally imaginative individualization. Thinking volition grasps itself in the exchange-of-being with the general spiritual world: the conceptional intuition is therefore one that manifests a part of the general spiritual world in the individual human being. Through volitional thinking, moral intuition, on the other hand, the individual human being manifests himself with his own unique new impulses in the spiritual world (and proceeding from there also in the physical world). Thus, conceptional and moral intuitions do not only differ in the sense that the former strives for an existing existentiality, the latter for a futurality, but also in that through the former the knower individualizes himself, while through the latter the agent conveys his own individualization impulse to the spiritual as well as to the physical world. From the source of the desire to unite with the spirit the moral intuitive formative impulses arise, which out of moral imagination continue developing themselves towards intentions leading thereby to such resolutions, which on the basis of their spiritual substance are not only creative, but also capable of compliance, i.e. viable, because they build on the transformational ability of the matter on hand.

The volitional direction of the conceptional driving forces of action therefore runs opposite to that of cognition. The same is valid for the way in which the volitional goals (motives) are attained and formed. Here it is not a question, as is the case with cognition, of becoming aware of the feature of the perceptually displayed reality with regard to its given nature. Instead, the individual characteristic is to be imprinted on it that only comes about anew through free, inventive action. Productive action therefore proceeds indeed from a given situation with which it is initially connected in an instinctive consciousness of reality, but develops the drive to transform the given in accordance with the moral intuition and the desire to impart it the shape of the freely chosen motive in which it finally is reshaped.

As with thinking volition, the spiritual driving forces can be differentiated with regard to volition thinking in their conceptional development and motives in their gradual volitional formation. This difference, however, does not signify with regard to free actions one of a temporal succession. For in free actions the motives and driving forces coincide with regard to their conceptional nature. Just as is the case with thinking volition both elements are therefore interconnected and mutually stimulate each other.

Accordingly, the course of unfoldment of volition thinking that reaches its goal in the transformation of existentiality can be listed as follows: Wish – Intention – Resolution – Instinct – Drive – Desire – Motive (see the schema again). The same can be said for the involved parts of the human being.


2

It may be of great interest to note that both of these successive courses of human volitional unfoldment are found in The Philosophy of Freedom as formal elements. They determine the composition of the first and fourteenth chapters.

The first chapter (“Conscious Human Action”) is devoted to clearing the view on the problem. Because the latter is covered by the prevailing prejudgments (back then and basically today as well). That is why a series of examples are given “proving that many fight against freedom without really knowing what freedom is.” The views brought to bear have a peculiar mistake in common. For all these thinkers surprisingly fail to notice the most obvious thing. None of them differentiate namely between those actions of which the agent does not know why he does them, and those of which the reasons are clear to him.
        
Yet Rudolf Steiner does not content himself with introducing the reader to the state of the scientific discussion at that time. Instead, he introduces representatives of those views that, in the way that they are brought forward, correspond to the stages of human volitional development. His presentation thereby obtains, in spite of its time-conditioned context, a significance that is not effaced by the passage of time.

Here three things are noteworthy: 1. Rudolf Steiner does not limit himself to criticism, but uses it, already at the begin of his work to positively introduce its basic theme, namely the structure of human nature as a mirror-image of its volitional unfoldment; 2. since this is at the beginning of his deliberations not yet possible though relating its contents, it happens through the form by introducing the human essential structure as the compositional principle of the first chapter; the conceptional art unity of form and content thereby becomes a mood enhancing cognitive overture; 3. the from the viewpoint of human volitional unfoldment compositionally arranged contents appear in such a sequence which, on the one hand, corresponds to the character of the chapter that it obtains through its integration in the over-all composition of the book, on the other hand, however, the composition of the first chapter is also, as will appear, of great importance for the composition of the whole book.

Seven writers are brought forward who “fight against freedom, without really knowing what freedom is.” The report about their viewpoints is made in a sequence such that it corresponds to the unfoldment of thinking volition. From the perspective of conceptional art this cannot be otherwise, for the first part of The Philosophy of Freedom is devoted to the nature of cognition and therefore constitutes the scientific basis for its second part about “The Reality of Freedom”.

As the first of those fighters against something unknown to them David Friedrich Strauss is quoted, at that time an in general (albeit not by his contemporary Nietzsche) highly praised representative of superficiality, who still up to this day belongs to those who by thrashing truisms or untruisms to death achieve resounding glory. In The Old and New Faith, he believes to say something of obvious validity concerning the question of freedom by pointing to the always present reason that causes the agent to perform one of many possible actions. He fails to see that he thereby merely states that freedom cannot simply be freedom of choice proceeding as one sees fit. – He focusses on that element of human volitional development that asserts itself in every action as its motive. That there are different sort of motives and that their significance for human action could thus be quite different, is not taken into consideration.

The guideline for the citation of the following opponents of freedom follows from the step by step development of thinking volition.

Herbert Spencer (in The Principles of Psychology) maintains that the sentence that lays at the basis for the “dogma of free will” is “that … everyone can desire as he sees fit or not.” Since this sentence is senseless, it must also be the case for the “dogma of free will”. – Spencer points justifiably to the desiring, intentional part of an action. He fails to see, however, that this in no way has to be the sole leading motive for an action and that it itself requires a conceptional origin, which  
first, if present, can be intentionalized (as articulated above) and without which the intentionalization would hang in the air.

Spinoza voices (in a letter) the view that people consider themselves to be free because  stronger desires suppress the weaker ones. The so-called freedom consists in nothing else than “that people are aware of their desires but do not know the reasons by which they are determined.” Examples verifying his view are the behavior of children that desire milk or drunks who say things that they later regret. – Neither Spinoza differentiates between actions caused  by drives arising from the depths of the organism and those of which the agent is conscious. Yet he also draws attention to a part that indeed belongs to the course of volitional development. The element of desire indicates in itself the transcendental intentional condition of the desiring agent, while the drives are more characterized by their willingness to transform themselves into their object (to undergo a metamorphosis).

Eduard von Hartmann represents (in his Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness) also with reference to the questions of freedom and will the view that is central for his whole work. According to Hartmann’s conviction true being remains unknown to the knower, he experiences of it only through the modifications of his own conditions that spring from transcendent sources. The only possibility left therefore is to develop conclusions about that which remains unconscious. Hence, for him the following sentence is valid with regard to the problem of freedom. “When we however also initially raise the mental representations to motives, we after all do not do so arbitrarily, but according to the necessity of our characterological disposition, thus no less free.” The characterological disposition is determined by the intrinsically existing human nature that, like everything else, is not directly knowable and therefor remains unconscious – Here too the difference between motives permeated by consciousness and those that effect the agent without his clear knowledge remains unconsidered. The naively sensed certainty of reality, without which there is no correspondence between subject and object, is an instinctive one, as long as its origin is not revealed though psychic observation. This element comes in Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious to the fore.  Also for superwakeful observation conscious awareness there remains an impact of this subconscious coalescence with something unattainable through thinking, with individualness that initially heralds itself as a riddle, but that nevertheless is unlimitedly fathomable and just therein revealing its mysteriousness. Eduard von Hartmann devoted his research work to this revealing mysteriousness and mysterious revelation, whereby he was admittedly distracted through his tendency to make abstract conclusions from the path to psychic observation that would have led him to The Philosophy of Freedom.

Robert Hammerling describes (in his Atomism of Will) his conviction with the following words: “The human being can … do what he is willing to do – but he cannot be willing to do what he is willing, because his will is determined by motives." Rudolf Steiner answers him, “It is not a question as to whether I can carry out a resolution I made, but how the resolution arose in me.” – Once again an element of volitional development, the resolution comes to the fore, yet again without the knowledge of its function in the process it belongs to. However, for Hammerling’s vitality, his sense of life is characteristic that he brings this feature to the fore. For, as was articulated in the afore-going, the human being makes his resolutions from his essential connection with the spirit. It is this that enables us to offer resistance against our bodily organization, assures us superiority over its imprisoning frailties and limitations.

Paul Rée (in The Illusion of Freedom of the Will) believes to be able to substantiate his rejection of freedom through the fact that the causal determinations of our actions are not perceivable, from which the mistake arises that we are free. – The volitional function intoned hereby is the intention that is active in action, its underlying mental representation. The mental representations that constitute the intentions of our action, can indeed be causally determined, but they can also be attained from freely formed intuitions through moral imagination.

The last thinker that appears in this row is Hegel. His statement is cited, “Only thinking makes the soul, with which animals are also endowed, into spirit.” It is clear that once again a mode of unfoldment of thinking volition is intoned. It is desire that leads the human being beyond his own momentary condition as well as beyond the world surrounding him. As a thinker the human being is a constant wisher, he continually aspires to attain more than his senses, his bodily organization can give him. The thinking human being, who through his thinking comes into action, is a wisher beyond himself and the world. – Even though Hegel’s whole philosophy reflects this experience, he does not, however, arrive at a true philosophy of freedom. Granted, statements can be found in his work (next to many similar ones) such as: “The idea of right is freedom” (The Philosophy of Right) and “The substance, the essence of the spirit is freedom” (Philosophy of History). Yet he misses the view for the unique significance of free individualizing (moral imagination), without which the idea of freedom cannot be conceived. This deficient insight is related to Hegel’s basic attitude that prompts him to turn his whole and sole interest to the metamorphosis of the concept and to let the perceptual world slip away from his attention.

The conceptional art structure of The Philosophy of Freedom can be indicated by the following schema:

                   D. F. Strauss          - Motive
                   H. Spencer            - Desire
                   B. de Spinoza        - Drive
                   E. v. Hartmann      - Instinct
                   R. Hammerling      - Resolution
                   P. Rée                   - Intention
                   G. W. F. Hegel        - Desire

One recognizes that  the composition of this chapter is based on the unfoldment of thinking volition in connection with the structure of human nature. This connection however does not exist because the text was squeezed into a rigid, previously present schema. Instead, that special form of volitional movement was chosen as a model of composition that corresponds to the special epistemological task of the first part of the work.[4]

                    
3

The previously presented arrangement of both parts, their correspondence in the direction of representation suggests that the same form of composition, yet in a metamorphosis corresponding to the representational field, can be rediscovered in the fourteenth (and last) chapter  of the second part. That this is indeed the case, shall now be demonstrated.

The fourteenth chapter (“Individuality and Species”) begins with the question whether, in view of the overlapping influences that make the individual into a whole, individual integrity, self-contained free individuality is still possible. This question, pertaining to the desire of the human being who properly understands himself, to be a spirit self in his sphere of freedom independent of natural and social influences is posed in the first two paragraphs.

In the third paragraph the question is put if there can be life spirit intentions. For the physiognomy and action of individual human beings assume through their affiliation to a nation, a folk something of a generic nature. His attributes, his modes of behavior are insofar not bio-spiritually determined (through his free integration in a social and knowledge community context) but by way of group souls. For life spirit action, however, these are characterological predeterminations of the transformational material that, by grasping and forming the latter, brings its individual characteristic to expression.

The content of the fourth paragraph is human sovereignty. Man throws the uniform of the species away, he applies the attributes given to him by nature as the basis for his disposal over himself and gives them the shape peculiar to his own nature. He is able to break the spell of his corporeal humanness and to make his spirit man resolutions the basis of his selfhood and the content of his action. From this source the desirous upsurge of his spirit self is fed, as are the life spirit resolutions, for which the characterological predetermination is only the transformation material that his individual characteristic grasps and forms.

The fifth paragraph brings to light a tendency of public and scientific opinion cultivated by natural science. Judging the human being by the features of his male or female organism renders it blind for the human being proper. It should be conscious of the fact that it only comes to an understanding of instinctivity. In views of this sort, the course that the prevailing materialistic-naturalistic mentality has taken comes to the fore. For this mindset Man is a natural being: it lacks the view that he does not bring his true nature through his physically determined instincts to expression but through their spiritualized transformation.

The sixth paragraph is devoted to a basic question of personal and social life, which before Rudolf Steiner’s time had never been conceived of in this manner. It belongs to those misjudged and underestimated issues, the clarification of which, as soon as it is put in perspective, immediately appears simply and directly convincing. Yet the formulation of the so urgently necessary insight has hitherto been lacking and the foray against it remains furthermore notoriously apparent. It concerns nothing less than the constant willingness to disregard human dignity. After all, nothing seems more justified and substantiated than to judge a human being by means of the concepts of one’s own reflection and accepting as true with respect to the person to be judged. No proof is needed for the frequency of such  (positive or negative) censorial judgments. Whoever judges in that manner overlooks completely that his thinking moves in a direction prescribed by force of habit. He does not bear in mind thereby that this mode of judgment is only permissible in case of creatures of nature. With creatures of nature and everything that has object character, “the observer must obtain the concepts through his intuitions; in the case of understanding a free individuality it is only a matter of carrying over their concepts, according to which it determines itself, purely (without mingling with his own thought content) into our spirit. Persons who in every judgment of another immediately mix in their own concepts, can never reach an understanding of an individuality. Just as in the way that a free individuality liberates itself from the peculiarities of the species, cognition has to liberate itself from the way how the generic is understood.” It is easy to realize that here the cure for social conflicts is not only named but even given. Yet it is also no less easy to realize how difficult it is to apply.

In the case of human beings it is not a question of regarding the vital drives that are inborn in the structure of a living being and that permeate it. Rather, attention should be paid as to how it gives itself a spiritual life form and how it develops the driving forces of its action in such a way that they correspond to the structure of its own nature that it itself erected. The truly human incentives of a human being (this is said in this passage of the chapter) can only be understood from its own spiritual life, its transformation of natural into spiritual vital forces.

In the seventh chapter it is acknowledged that a human being is just as little wholly individuality as wholly species. But striving for individuality is the goal and nobility of is soul life. Only in this pursuit can a truly human soul life be developed, it is the noblest desire, the desire for humanness.

To the main thought of the seventh paragraph, the ennoblement of our intentional essence, the eight and last paragraphs add the one of free motivation. Through the unification of the motives of free human beings generic and group-based communities are transformed into knowledge communities. Only in the latter do human beings live out their lives as bearers of an individual spirit, as I-beings, and only therein are they appreciated by the members of such a community with regard to their I-related cast of mind (Geistesart) and spiritual stature. The chapter ends with the words, “The moral life of humanity is the total sum of the moral imaginations produced by free human individualities. This is the result of monism.”



If one summarizes the first, both content related paragraphs of the chapter, then the resultant overview shows a sevenfold structure. This corresponds in the expected reversal to the first chapter. Both chapters are based on the structural principle of human volitional unfoldment, yet in one case in the continuous form of thinking volition, in the other in that of volitional thinking (externally directed action). Thus, Chapter I points out how the human being originates out of his own spiritual activity, his thinking volition, while Chapter XIV draws the attention of the critic to the unique manner in which human volitional thinking integrates itself in the social and general reality.

4

The main content of the work culminates in a declaration of human dignity. This is human self-creation from self-comprehension requiring no other reason than that of freedom. One considers oneself modest when upon passing a judgment one’s own subjective limitation and its need for amendment is flaunted in beautiful humility. From this “humbleness” follows the willingness to reach consensus, to fall in line with public opinion. Granted, among free human beings the interest for the mindset of the other will always be an unlimited one. Just now, the elusiveness of the essential nature of one’s fellow human being through external attachment of concepts was spoken of and emphasized that the tendency for forming censorial judgments signifies a lack of respect for the inviolable nature in every human being. Just for that reason, however, the courage for the validity of one’s own carefully considered judgment is also a demand of self-respect. For free communities do not arise through the blurred mixture of average, run of the mill opinions, but through the unified concord of many-colored cognizant aspirations for that communal consciousness generated by the unison of free insights. The thoroughly individual nature of a judgment is not its weakness but its strength. For genuine community does not require collectivity but individuality. The less individually pronounced a judgment, the less it can lay claim to be heard by an audience armed with the faculty of discrimination, the more so, to each higher degree, when it shows its true countenance. A judgment steeped in cognizance requires no amendment, because it is precisely that in which others holding different views can concur. It defies amending, because it is a variation of the whole, befriending other variants. A judgment is fully valid  in so far as it is thoroughly individual, while a merely repetitive accordance does not exclude doubt as to its validity, since it begs the question whether it is individually wrought or just a trainbearer of the rumor of public opinion. An individual judgment does not amend judgments formed from other perspectives, provided it is derived from real knowledge, but rather strengthens it and therefore the variety of individual judgments is even a community building factor. For the diversity of individual judgments includes the respect for and the forming of every other real contribution to the community spirit, and the insight that the community attains nothing from a “levelling” consensus, but only by offering each and every one the widest possible scope of individual unfoldment. The deviation of a judgment from public opinion is a yardstick for the probability of its truth and a building block for a true communal consciousness. A community building judgment is not servile but proud, - proud not in the reflex of vanity of oneself, but in confidence of oneself without becoming presumptuous, in confidence of the spiritual gaze transcending the merely personal. The generic nature of public opinion is the lack of interest of its members for each other and the seeking of protection of those in anonymity who do not dare to be themselves The public confession to one’s own insight in the awareness to thereby turn oneself into the receiving end of collective resentment is in contrast the manifestation of the highest respect for the ability of the addressee to bust the templates of habitual ways of thinking. Here too the words of Goethe are valid: “What is the general? The individual case. What is the particular? Millions of cases.”

Since a true anthropology can only be a manifesto of human dignity, it is not surprising that its structural design is humanness.

The first chapter of the first main part and the last chapter of the second main part are based, as emerges from what was presented, on the same structural principle, - yet in different metamorphosis. This is an important observation, for it presents the key to the structure of the whole work. The next chapter shall enter into this.     




[1] The psychic realm normally designated as self or “I” is split up in a threefold manner. The concept etheric body (identical with the vital or formative body) refers to the forces context of the living organism divided in originating and functional stages.
[2] The designation “body” or “corporeality” is applied to all parts of our nature that we find in us as a given, which we therefore do not bring forth though our spiritual formative force, which we do not bestow on us, but that are bestowed upon us.
[3] All these German words between brackets contain in one form of another the word Grund, meaning ground or reason.  This cognitive “word game” is lost in translation. (Note by tr.)
[4] These relations were already worked out a long time ago by the author and were occasionally seized without considering the wider context to which they belong. This led to a totally wrong  schematism in strict contrast to the conceptional art purpose. One does not approach Rudolf Steiner’s conceptional art technique by distilling a sterile skeleton from the living organism of his work and possibly even using it as part of one’s own construction. One senses the living breath of his work only by participating in the mutual permeation of matter and form, of content and shape, their intertransformation,  that constitutes the living stream of his presentation. One then becomes aware of something individual peculiar to him and only to him and just therefore valid in general. 



PART II - CHAPTER 12


THE STAGES IN THE PATH OF SCHOOLING OF THE ARTIST


All stages in the path of schooling of "The Philosophy of Freedom" give rise to experiences which accompany the creative work of the artist. They reveal themselves in constantly new configurations and confront him with one riddle after the other. Each time he becomes in different ways consciously aware of matter and form.

The stages of the path which the artist, guided by the experiences of psychic observation according to the "The Philosophy of Freedom", can embark on, are given once more in the following summary:

Experience of Exchange-of-Being (Folding of Hands)
Experience of Awakening and Protection (Waking and Praying)
Experience of Veiling and Unveiling (Upper and Lower Divinity)
Experience of Reality (The Individual above Us)
Experience of Freedom (The Universal in Us)
Social Experience (Dissolution of the Alloy Soul King)
Experiences of Re-embodiment of the Spirit and Destiny (Light and Love)

The foregoing expositions were designed in such a way that those following them traverse a path of training and schooling in the sense and spirit of Rudolf Steiner’s "The Philosophy of Freedom", the goal of which is the experience of re-embodiment of the spirit and that of destiny in light and love. This presentation is therefore also meant as a contribution towards understanding Rudolf Steiner’s indication that real, truly modern art is a way towards knowledge of re-embodiment of the spirit and of destiny in living experience. At this point the question (here only parenthetically answered) must be raised as to what extent the training course in psychic observation leads to the development of such organs capable of supersensory perception. A thorough answer to this question shall remain reserved for a publication devoted to that theme.